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ABSTRACT
This thesis consists of an introduction and two parts. Part I 
deals with wage and employment determination under labour 
bargaining, and is formed of chapters 1 and 2. Part II looks at 
the role of inflation expectations in macroeconomic models, and 
is divided into chapters 3, 4 and 5.
Chapter 1 sets forth and tests a model of labour bargaining in 
which the firm and the union are only constrained by the other 
party's available market alternatives if these are credible. 
Empirical findings, based on a panel of UK manufacturing firms, 
show some support for the main predictions of the model.
Chapter 2 generalizes the theoretical framework developed in 
the previous chapter and explores its robustness with respect to 
changes to some of the assumptions.
Chapter 3 assesses the literature on the relationship between 
inflation expectations, wage and price flexibility and 
variability of output. Expectations of future price changes may 
have a destabilizing effect on output if expected inflation moves 
procyclically.
Chapter 4 looks at an overlapping wage contract model and 
derives analytical conditions for output destabilization to occur 
as wages and prices become more flexible. A new classical 
specification of the supply side is then considered, and price 
rigidity is established to be neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition for increased output volatility.
Chapter 5 analyses a monopolistically competitive framework
—  2 —
with synchronized wage setting. Explicit consideration of the 
expected inflation effect makes employment and output variability 
more likely to increase with contract length.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis is composed of two parts. Part I is concerned with 
labour bargaining and the determination of wages and employment. 
Part II studies the relationship between wage and price 
flexibility, inflation expectations, and variability of output.
Recent analyses of the employment relationship recognize the 
importance of non-competitive elements in the labour market. 
Job-specific investment on the side of both the firm and the
workers generates ex post monopolistic rents for the incumbent 
employees vis-à-vis workers from outside the firm. The 
pervasiveness of asymmetric information between firm and workers 
in the form of adverse selection or moral hazard provides a 
further rationale for departures from the Walrasian spot paradigm 
of the labour market (Akerlof and Yellen (1986)).
The first section of the thesis (chapters 1 and 2) focusses on 
labour bargaining. The literature originated by McDonald and
Solow (1981) endeavours to explain wages and employment as the
outcome of a bargaining between the firm and the union of its
workers. If negotiations have both wages and employment as 
arguments, as assumed by McDonald and Solow, the bargaining is 
efficient (in the sense of Leontief (1946)) since it leaves no 
unexploited gains from trade. If the firm and the union only 
bargain over the wage, and employment is left at the discretion 
of the firm, one has right-to-manage (Nickel1 and Andrews 
(1983)). If the relative bargaining strength of the parties over
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wages is different than over employment, the negotiations may 
take the form of a sequential bargaining as set out by Manning 
(1987). Finally, if the union unilaterally sets the wage and the 
firm is left free to decide on the employment level, the 
situation is described as a monopoly union (surveys on the 
various forms of bargaining are provided by Oswald (1985), Farber 
(1986), and Ulph and Ulph (1990)).
A different strand of the literature has explicitly addressed 
the issue of the extent to which employed and unemployed workers 
can be regarded as substitutes {insider-oatsider models of the 
labour market: Lindbeck and Snower (1988), Blanchard and Summers 
(1986)). The relevance of this analysis lies in the possibility 
of accounting for the hysteretic behaviour of output and other 
real variables, and hence for the persistence of unemployment in 
the face of temporary negative shocks to the level of activity.
The game theoretical literature on bargaining has in the 
meantime undergone impressive developments after the seminal work 
by Rubinstein (1982) (important contributions were put forward by 
Shaked and Sutton (1984), Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky 
(1986), Binmore, Shaked and Sutton (1989); useful expositions are 
Sutton (1986), Kreps (1990), and Osborne and Rubinstein (1990)). 
This research programme explicitly relates the bargained outcome 
to strategic behaviour by rational players. The structure of the 
game is analysed in its extensive form, rather than in the more 
conventional normal form as in the traditional axiomatic 
analysis. The solution to the game is required to meet the (sub­
game) perfectness condition.
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This strategic approach to bargaining games clarifies the role 
of the fall-back positions of the players and of the outside 
opportunities which are available to them if negotiations with 
the incumbent partner were to break down ioutside options). A 
particularly startling implication of assuming that the parties 
behave strategically is that their outside options should only 
actually affect the negotiated outcome insofar as they act as 
binding constraints on the players. Otherwise, they should not be 
regarded as credible and should thus be completely ineffective.
The previous analysis seems to be particularly suited to 
characterize labour bargains between a firm and the union of its 
currently employed workers. Each party can be regarded as endowed 
with an outside option which consists of interrupting the 
relationship with its incumbent partner and taking up a market 
alternative, i.e. to quit and look for a new job (workers), or 
firing (a part of) the current workforce and hiring new employees 
(firms). According to the outside option principle (Binmore, 
Shaked and Sutton (1989)) these market alternatives should only 
matter if they represent credible threats. If they do, then the 
negotiated outcome should be entirely driven by these outside 
options. By contrast, if they are not credible the bargaining 
process should be determined by "insider" variables.
Chapter 1 develops and tests a model of wage and employment 
determination in which the importance of insider and outside 
factors can vary across firms and over time. Three bargaining 
regimes are identified: in two of them the outcome is dictated by 
outside market conditions, whilst in the third there is scope for
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insider factors. Econometric estimation on a panel of British 
manufacturing firms over the period 1972-1982 confirms the 
existence of such structural breaks in the rent sharing 
behaviour.
Chapter 2 provides some theoretical extensions to the model 
set out in the previous chapter. Different objective functions 
for the union are analysed and their comparative statics 
predictions are illustrated. Then, efficiency wage considerations 
are combined with the bargaining framework and the sensitivity of 
the latter to alternative informational assumptions is assessed. 
Finally, some implications of the analysis for union membership 
are considered.
The second part of the thesis (chapters 3, 4 and 5) studies 
the relationship between wage/price flexibility and variability 
of output, when aggregate demand depends on expected inflation 
via the ex ante real interest rate. The motivation for the 
analysis lies in the consideration that, contrary to static 
models, in a dynamic framework increased nominal flexibility may 
have perverse effects on the level of activity by exacerbating 
output fluctuations.
Following an exogenous demand shock, real money balances move 
counter-cyclically acting thus as an automatic stabilizer. 
Expected inflation, however, can move either pro- or counter- 
cyclically. Whether output destabilization ensues depends on the 
behaviour of the supply side of the economy (in particular, on 
the product market structure and the specific source of nominal
—  12 —
rigidities), on the degree of serial autocorrelation of the 
demand disturbances, and on the process of expectations 
formation.
An obvious link with the first part of the thesis is provided 
by the presence of imperfections in the labour market. Nominal 
wage inflexibility requires some departures from the strictly 
competitive paradigm. The existence of bargaining over workers’ 
remuneration, and possibly over manning levels, and the role 
played by insider factors contribute to making wages and 
employment less sensitive to labour market imbalances. An 
important difference with the analysis developed in the first 
part of the thesis lies however in the fact that labour 
bargaining yields real rigidities. It is increasing acknowledged, 
on the other hand, that an explanation of the main stylized facts 
of economic fluctuations requires both real and nominal 
rigidities (see e.g. Blanchard and Fischer (1989) and Ball and 
Romer (1990)).
The possible destabilizing role of expected inflation is 
already present in Keynes (1936, chap. 19). Tobin (1975) has 
formally shown that increased price flexibility might be 
destabilizing when inflation expectations are formed adaptively. 
More recently, DeLong and Summers (1986) have set forth the 
proposition that output variability might increase as wages and 
prices become more responsive to disequilibrium conditions in the 
labour and goods market, even under rational expectations. 
Chapter 3 assesses how alternative mechanisms of expectation 
formation and different specifications of the supply side of the
—  13 —
economy may be critical in generating a destabilizing outcome.
In their original contribution, DeLong and Summers (1986) 
present simulation results which show that output variability 
increases over the cycle as wages become more flexible, in a 
staggered contract framework à-la Taylor (1979, 1980) augmented
to allow for both autoregressive demand disturbances and the 
expected inflation effect on aggregate demand. Their results hold 
for a wide range of parameters of the model, and from this they 
conclude that policies aimed at enhancing the degree of 
flexibility of labour markets may be counterproductive.
DeLong and Summers are however unable to derive analytical 
results. In chapter 4 exact conditions are derived for 
destabilization to occur in a variant of Fischer's (1977) model 
with predetermined wage setting. It is shown that increased wage 
flexibility may either dampen or exacerbate output fluctuations, 
depending on %he values of the parameters. The asymptotic 
variance of output decreases if demand shocks exhibit a low 
degree of serial correlation as in the simulations by DeLong and 
Summers (1986).
Chapter 4 also demonstrates that nominal inertia is not a 
necessary requirement for the expected inflation effect to exert 
a destabilizing influence. By making use of standard new 
classical specifications of the supply side, it is shown that 
inflation expectations can move either pro- or counter- 
cyclically depending on parameter values. Again, the degree of 
serial correlation of demand disturbances turns out to be 
crucial.
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Chapter 5 generalizes a monopolistic competition model with 
synchronized contracts originally set out by Ball (1987). 
Employment and output variability under alternative contracting 
lengths are explored, and the externalities associated with the 
different regimes are evaluated under both white noise and 
autocorrelated demand disturbances. It is established that the 
presence of the expected inflation effect makes it unambiguously 
more likely that short contracts are desirable. The reason for 
this result lies in the fact that, under monopolistic 
competition, both labour demand and output supply directly depend 
on aggregate demand. Longer contracts lessen the variability of 
real wages, but at the same time increase the volatility of real 
balances and expected inflation over the cycle.
Finally, chapter 5 demonstrates that the expected inflation 
effect can be a channel for the effectiveness of stabilization 
policy. The presence of an element of intertemporal substitution 
in the economy creates the scope for active demand management 
(see also Buiter (1989)). It is shown that leaning-against-the- 
wind monetary rules dominate increased flexibility as a 
stabilization tool.
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CHAPTER 1 
BARGAINING WITH OUTSIDE OPTIONS:
WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT IN UK MANUFACTURING 1974-1982
1. Introduction
This chapter studies the determinants of wages and employment 
at the firm level. The main question which is addressed is the 
extent to which external market pressures are important relative 
to economic variables which are specific to the firm. One can 
interpret the former set of factors as outsider variables, and 
the latter as reflecting the importance of insider variables. The 
research is therefore a microeconomic investigation on insider 
versus outsider factors in wage and employment determination. It 
can thus provide some evidence on the role played by the 
currently incumbent workers in affecting the economic conditions 
at the workplace (see e.g. Lindbeck and Snower, 1986, 1988a). The 
issue has recently attracted considerable attention in view of 
its alleged capability of explaining the high and persistent 
levels of unemployment in Western countries^.
The theoretical model developed in the first part of the 
chapter (section 2), and then tested in the second part (sections
^Blanchard and Summers (1986, 1987); see also Lindbeck and Snower 
(1988b) and Layard and Bean (1989).
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3-5), is a variant of the efficient bargains model of the labour 
market, modified in accordance to recent developments in 
non-cooperative game theory.
The classical model of union bargaining is set out in McDonald 
and Solow (1981). The firm and the union bargain over wages and 
employment simultaneously, and the outcome is thus efficient in 
the sense of Leontief (1946)^. Traditional (axiomatic) bargaining 
models, however, present some fundamental problems since they do 
not specify the structure of the game played by agents. The 
commonly adopted solution concept is the cooperative Nash 
solution to the bargaining problem (Nash, 1950, 1953). The status 
quo positions of the parties are given by their respective 
payoffs if the bargain terminates without an agreement. They are 
alternatively identified with the threats made during the 
negotiations.
Recent work in non-cooperative (strategic) game theory 
(Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 1986; Sutton, 1986) suggests 
however that, in bargaining games which take place over time and 
in which the driving force to reach a settlement is the players'
^Nickell and Andrews (1983), by contrast, assume that the bargain 
has the wage as the only argument. The level of employment is 
unilaterally chosen by the firm on its labour demand schedule, 
after wages have been set (right-to-manage). The literature on 
firm-union bargaining is surveyed by Oswald (1985) and Ulph and 
Ulph (1990).
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impatience (the cake 'shrinks'), the status quo positions should 
correctly be identified with the utility levels attained by the 
parties while negotiations are in progress. The threats of the 
players should instead be modelled as outside options open to 
them. In the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game, these 
threats would only be implemented if they are credible: either
party must find it profitable to actually withdraw from the 
negotiations with the incumbent partner. If this is the case, 
then the latter should concede the former exactly the value of 
its outside option in order to avoid the breakdown of the 
relationship. If neither outside option is credible, however, 
they should play no role whatsoever on the outcome of the 
bargain: only the status quo of the parties and their payoff
functions should determine how the joint surplus is divided^.
The previous analysis applies quite naturally to the bargain 
between a firm and its incumbent labour force. The outside 
options of the parties can be seen as given by their external 
market alternatives, reflecting the role of outsider factors. By 
contrast, the status quo positions, and the players’ impatience, 
represent insider factors in bargaining. There might thus exist 
regimes in which the outcome is essentially driven by outside 
market conditions, and cases in which insider factors are 
crucial.
^Experimental support for this outside option principle has been 
provided by Binmore, Shaked and Sutton (1989).
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The above considerations provide a neat theoretical framework 
to test the empirical relevance of insider/outsider models. The 
larger the weight of those firms which appear to be constrained 
by external market conditions, the more quantitatively relevant 
is the role played by outsider factors in explaining observed 
macroeconomic phenomena. It should be noticed that the analysis 
developed here is able to avoid a common shortcoming of the 
empirical literature on the subject, namely assuming that the 
relative weight of internal versus external factors is the same
4
across firms and over time .
The model is estimated on a panel of UK manufacturing firms 
from 1974 until 1982^. The empirical findings confirm the 
existence of important structural breaks across firms in wage 
setting. They also seem to point out that the role played by 
insider factors is largely restricted to a small proportion of
*Nickell and Wadhwani (1990) allow their measure of insider power 
to vary across industries, but not over time. Their wage equation 
is a combination of "insider" and "outsider" variables. However, 
it is simply postulated that the opportunity set of workers 
during a strike is the same as if they quit or are laid off. This 
assumption would not be easy to justify on search theoretic 
grounds, and effectively rules out the distinction between status 
quo and outside option for the union.
^This data set has already been analyzed by Nickel1 and Wadhwani 
(1988, 1990) and Wadhwani and Wall (1988a, 1988b).
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firms during the sample period.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In the next 
section the basic theoretical model is outlined. Section 3 
presents the econometric methodology. In section 4 the use of a 
priori information on the classification of firms across regimes 
is discussed. Section 5 gives econometric estimates of wage and 
employment equations. Section 6 concludes.
2. Bargaining with outside options
The present section develops the basic theoretical model. The 
firm and the union are assumed to have objective functions 
defined over wages and employment and to bargain over both 
arguments. Following Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky’s (1986) 
strategic interpretation of non-cooperative bargaining games, the 
parties maximize their joint surplus over and above their status 
quo points. These are defined as the levels of utility, or 
profits, which the union and the firm would respectively receive 
in the event of a strike or a lockout. The maximization is 
subject to the constraint that the outcome of the bargain should 
deliver each party at least the level of utility/profits 
obtainable if it were to terminate the relationship with its 
incumbent partner and take up its market alternative. If the 
bargains are driven by strategic considerations, the 'threats' of 
the players should only actually affect the outcome insofar as 
they are credible.
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The firm
The firm is assumed to be risk neutral and to operate under a 
constant returns to scale technology. Its objective function is
(1) n(W,N) = P-F(K.N) - WN - rK
where W is the wage, N the level of employment, P the output 
price, K the input of capital stock, and r the rental price of 
capital. The production function F(*,*) is assumed to satisfy the 
Inada properties. The status quo is the level of profits (or 
losses) which the firm would make in the event of a lockout or a 
strike. Here the assumption is made that the status quo profits 
are simply proportional to the capital stock:
(2) TT = -pK
where p is the cost per unit of capital which has to be borne 
whilst negotiations are in progress. The outside option is the 
level of profits if the firm were to replace its current labour 
force, or part of it, and employ workers from outside the firm. 
It is therefore given by
(3) n*" = n*(ui,W,z)
where u^ is the industry-specific unemployment rate (ôIT*/ôu^ > 
0), W is a measure of the relevant alternative wage (ôTT*/ôW < 0), 
and z are hiring and firing costs (e.g., training costs and
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severance payments).
The union
The union is here defined as the party with whom the firm is 
negotiating. Its objective is to maximize the utility rents to 
its employed members from reaching an agreement:
(4) U(W,N) = N-[V(W)-V(W)]
where V’(*)>0, V"(*)<0. The status quo is given by
(5) Ü = Ü(s)
where s are strike funds plus possibly earnings while on strike. 
The outside option is
(6) U*" = U*(u\, W, b)
with 6U*/6u^ < 0, dU*/dW > 0, and where b are unemployment
benefits (6U*/db > 0).
The bargain
Without loss of generality it is assumed that the market 
options which are open to the parties are strictly more valuable
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to them than their status quo while bargaining: n*>n and U*>U 
In the light of the interpretation given to outside options and 
status quo, this assumption is not restrictive. The constrained 
Nash bargain between the firm and the union can thus be 
characterized as follows:
(7) max [U(W,N) - U]“ [n(W,N) - n]'"“
(W.N)
subject to
(7a) U(W,N) 2: U°(u/,W,b)
(7b) n(W,N) 2: n*(u/,W,z)
where the parameter a reflects the relative bargaining strength 
of the union, and is possibly related to its size. Let A and p be 
the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated with the constraints (7a) 
and (7b) respectively. The first-order conditions are
(8a) aNV’(W)[U-U]“'^[n-n]^’“ - (l-a)N[u-u]“ [n-n] 
+ ANY’(W) - pN = 0
(8b) a[v(w)-v(w)] [u-u]“ + d - a ) [ u - u ] “ [PF.,-w] [n-n]
N
+ A[V(W)-V(W)] + p[PF^-W] = 0
^If either outside option is lower than the corresponding status 
quo, it can never be binding and can thus be neglected.
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(8c) A[U(W,N)-U*(u^,W,b)] = 0
(8d) p[n(W,N)-n*(u:,W,z)] = 0
where (8c) and (8d) are the complementary slackness equations. 
One can either have an interior solution, in which neither 
constraint is binding, or a solution in which either constraint 
is satisfied as an equality. The following cases (i)-(iii) may 
thus arise.
(i) Interior solution (X=p=0)
The first-order conditions can be written as
(9a) ^
"a "n
“U (i-a)n
(9b) — ^ + ---- — : = 0
U-U n-TT
Equation (9a) is the contract curve (CC). It expresses the 
equality between the marginal rate of employment-wage 
substitution for the firm and the union. Equation (9b) is the 
bargaining locus (BL), which determines the division of the rents 
amongst the parties. In terms of the objective functions (1) and
(4), equations (9a) and (9b) become respectively
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V  (W) 
(9a')---------
V(W)-VCW) PF^(K,N)-W
aV(W) (1-a)
(9b' )  _ -  _ = 0
N[V(W)-V(W)]-U PF(K,N)-WN-rK-n
(ii) Outside option binding for the union (U )- (\>0) 
By setting p=0 in (8a)-(8b) and using (8c) one obtains
(10a) U(W,N) = U°(ui,W,b)
(10b) V  (W) [PF^(K,N)-W] + (V(W)-V(W)] = 0
Equation (10a) is the outside option for the union, which must 
now be satisfied as an equality. The firm must concede the 
workers a wage-employment combination which yields the level of 
utility in order to prevent the labour force from quitting. 
Equation (10b) coincides with the contract curve (9a). The 
outcome of this constrained regime is thus efficient.
(ill) Outside option binding for the firm (IT**) - (p>0)
The union must concede the firm its outside option. The 
first-order conditions are now
(11a) n(W,N) = n°(ui,W,z)
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(11b) V’(W)[PF^(K,N)-W] + [V(W)-V(W)] = 0
Equation (11a) is the outside option for the firm. Equation (11b) 
is again the efficiency condition.
The above model can be represented on the (N,W) plane as in 
Fig. 1. The solid line CC is the contract curve, the dashed line 
BL is the bargaining locus, and U** and TT*’ are the outside option 
utility and profits for the union and the firm respectively. The 
only segment on the contract curve which is relevant from the 
point of view of bargaining is EE’ , which lies in between the 
outside options. If the bargaining locus BL intersects the 
contract curve along the segment EE’, then the equilibrium wage- 
employment combination is given by the solution to the 
unconstrained Nash bargain. By contrast, if the BL curve 
intersects the CC schedule outside the segment EE’ then the 
constrained Nash solution is given by the intersection of the CC 
curve with either U** or TT*. The outside options only affect the 
outcome insofar as they are biting.
3. Econometric issues
Let w^ , w*^  and w^ be latent variables describing the level of 
wages under the regimes U*, interior Nash, and TT* respectively. 
Let n be the level of employment and x, y be the regressors for w 
and n respectively. Then the log-linearised version of the model
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described in the previous section can be written as follows: 
(12a) = x ; /  + c l
(12b) = x’
it it it
(12c) w^ = x'
it it^ It
(13)
(14) = y;,S +
where i=l N; t=l T, and where the operator Me selects the
median value. It is further assumed that e =(c^ , e** , )’~
it it it it
N(0,o^lg) and t)^^-N(0,t )^ are independently distributed. 
Equations (12a)-(12c) and (13) describe the bargaining locus BL, 
with the level of wages written as the dependent variable. 
Equation (14) is the contract curve CC. Following the analysis of 
the previous section the rent sharing behaviour presents 
structural breaks across regimes, whereas the contract curve 
exhibits no such breaks since all efficient contracts lie on the 
same schedule.
In principle there exist sufficient exclusion restrictions to 
identify the single regimes in the bargaining locus. The outside 
option for the union (equation (12a)) is affected by variables 
such as unemployment benefits (see equation (6)), while the
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outside option for the firm (equation (12c)) depends on hiring 
and firing costs (see equation (3)). By contrast, the interior 
solution (12b) depends on firm specific variables such as profits 
(equations (9b), (9b')).
However, in the panel there are no available data at the firm 
level which would make it possible to identify each regime in 
terms of the above considerations only. Hence, I have proceeded 
to use theoretically grounded a priori information in order to 
have an initial allocation of firms across regimes. The
classification is based on the rent-seeking behaviour of the 
union (as analysed for instance in Machin, 1989) and is discussed 
in the next section. The estimates obtained from the initial 
allocation of firms are then used in order to compute the 
probabilities that each observation falls into the different
regimes, as explained in Appendix C. One can then recompute the
estimates along the lines set out by Kiefer ((1980a); see also 
(1980b)).
Given the bargaining locus and the regimes, the contract curve 
is easily identified by variables reflecting the relative
bargaining strength and by profits per head. The bargaining locus 
itself is identified by capital stock and output price in the 
contract curve. Equation (9b’) can in fact be rewritten as^
In the latter, U has been set equal to zero for convenience.
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(9b") + ^ _______ = 0
V( W)-V(W) n/N-(r- p ) ( K / W )
It is thus apparent that the bargaining locus only depends on 
capital via the capital/labour ratio. After controlling for 
(K/N), the BL curve is unaffected by changes in K and in P which 
instead shift the CC curve. By contrast, the latter does not 
depend on the bargaining strength parameter a and on profits per 
head, TI/N. There exist therefore sufficient exclusion 
restrictions to enable the identification of all the equations of 
the model, conditional on the regimes.
Let us define the indicator variables d^ =1 if w , d^ =0
it it it it
otherwise (h=TI,N,U), and the corresponding selection matrices 
D^=diag{d^^>. Then an initial estimate of the parameters of the 
model can be obtained by Weighted Generalized Instrumental 
Variables:
(15a) °y"ciVE ^ [X' D^Z(Z' D^Z)"^Z' D^X] D^Z(Z' D^Z) '  D*w
(15b) °yJJciVE ^ [X' D**Z(Z' D**Z)"^Z' D*X]"^X' D**Z(Z' D**Z)~^Z' D**w
(15c) °yJJciVE ^ [X’D^Z(Z’D^Z)‘^Z’d”x ]'^X’d”z (Z’d”z )"^Z’D^w
(15d) ^  <(w-Xy")'D*(w-Xy") + (w-Xy")’D”(w-Xy*')
+ (w-Xy")'D"(w-Xy")}
where Z is the matrix of instruments. The weighted estimation
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procedure must only be implemented for the bargaining locus (i.e. 
the 'wage' equation (12a)-(12c) and (13)). The contract curve
(14) exhibits no structural breaks, and hence does not require 
the separation of the regimes.
Given an initial set of estimates for one can use
the procedure described in Appendix C to compute p^^s Pr(d^^=l), 
h=n,N,U. These estimates can be used to form the matrices £2** s 
diag{p^^>, and new WGIVE values can be obtained by replacing the 
matrices with £2^  in (15a)-(15d) to obtain the following 
expressions:
(16a) = [X' £2^ Z(Z' £2^ Z)"^ Z' £2^ X]"^ X' £2^ Z(Z' £2^ Z)"^ Z' £2*w
(16b) = [X’£2*^ Z(Z’£2**Z)"^ Z’£2*^ X]"^ X’£2”Z(Z'£2**Z)"^ Z'£2'*W
(16c) = [X'£2”Z(Z'£2”Z)'^Z'£2”X]"^X’£2^ Z(Z'£2”Z)“ Z^'£2”W
(16d) ^  {(w-Xy")'0"(w-Xy*) + (w-Xy“)'£2**(w-Xy**)
+ (w-Xy")'£2"(w-Xy")}
Finally, in order to control for the firm-specific 
time-invariant fixed effects the Anderson-Hsiao (1981) procedure 
has been followed. The equations have been estimated in a 
differenced form, with lagged levels of the dependent variables
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being used as instruments®. Because of the switches between 
regimes, equations (15a)-(15c) and (16a)-(16c) must now be 
estimated simultaneously.
4. A priori information on regime switching
As discussed in the previous section, it would be extremely 
difficult to distinguish between regimes on the basis of 
endogenous information only. On the other hand, it is well known 
that the use of a priori information on sample separation 
improves the efficiency of the estimates in switching regression 
models (Kiefer, 1979; Schmidt, 1981).
The information used in the present chapter to provide an 
initial allocation of the firms is based on the responses of 
planned investment in capital stock and inventories to expected 
changes in output. Bean (1983) and Grout (1984) show that 
investment in capital stock is affected by the expected outcome 
of the bargains between the firm and the union. If the latter 
appropriates the ex post monopolistic rents which are generated 
after the physical investment has taken place, and if the firm 
anticipates this behaviour of the union, then investment is
®Arellano (1989) shows that using twice lagged instruments in a 
level format, rather than in differences, in the Anderson-Hsiao 
procedure leads to lower asymptotic standard errors, under 
plausible conditions.
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discouraged in the first place. Van der Ploeg (1987) analyses the 
issue as a dynamic game between the firm and the union, and 
explores the time inconsistency problems due to the union's 
incentive to renege its preannounced wage strategy. The planned 
changes in capital stock may thus provide a signal about the 
prevailing bargaining regime.
Analogously, Kahn (1987) shows that, if the firm plans its 
inventory holdings on the grounds of a stock-out avoidance 
motive, then the level of inventory investment is a positive 
function of the mark-up of prices over variable costs. In a 
bargaining framework the opportunity cost to the firm of stocking 
out, and hence the planned level of inventories, will be the 
greater the larger is the proportion of surplus which accrues to 
the firm.
In general, thus, the responses of investment in capital stock 
and inventories to expected changes in demand can be thought of 
as being highest when the firm receives most of the surplus, that 
is when the union must concede the firm its outside option level 
of profits. Conversely, the responses are smallest when the union
9
receives its outside option .
The following taxonomy is thus proposed.
9
This statement critically hinges upon the assumption that the 
outside options are more sensitive to the business cycle than the 
status quo. This seems to be a reasonable assumption to make.
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(a) IT**: the firm receives its outside option. The
opportunity cost of not adjusting its stocks in the face of 
expected changes in demand is high. As expected output demand 
rises, the firm increases its investment in both capital stock 
and inventories. Conversely, when output is expected to fall the 
firm has to reduce inventories and investment. Hence, AQ**A^>0 
and AQ®*AFG>0, where Q* is expected demand for output, K is 
capital stock and FG are inventories of finished goods.
(b) U*: the union receives its outside option. The
opportunity cost to the firm of not investing in capital stock in 
the face of expected demand increases is small. Hence, AQ**A^^O.
(c) N: interior solution. The surplus is shared between the
firm and the union. In this regime, the response of the firm to 
an expected demand increase is the "standard" one, i.e. it still 
invests in capital stock but now lets its inventories run down: 
AQ®-A^>0, AQ®-AFG<0.
The sample space is thus partitioned according to the 
classification rule presented in Table 1. Case I corresponds to 
the situation in which the union is constrained to concede the 
firm the outside option of the latter. Case II represents the 
interior (unconstrained) Nash solution. Finally, case III 
describes the situation in which the union receives its outside 
option.
The study makes use of a panel of 215 UK manufacturing firms 
from the EXSTAT data set from 1972 until 1982, collected by 
Sushi1 Wadhwani at LSE and described extensively in Wadhwani and
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Wall (1988a, 1988b). The classification of firms across regimes
is instead based on the CBI Industrial Trends Survey, which 
provides industry-wide information on the expected level of 
output and on planned investment in inventories and stocks of 
capital goods. After differencing the data and allowing for 
dynamics, the estimated regressions cover the period 1974-82.
In the sample, the average number of employees per firm 
experiences a dramatic fall from 9,078 in 1974 to 6,326 in 1982,
i.e. a 30.3% decrease. In the same period nominal wages rise at a 
rate of 15.2% per year. The pattern of regime classification 
implied by the separation rule is shown in Table 2. According to 
the rule, 56% of the observations fall into regime IT**, in which 
the union is constrained to concede the firm its outside option. 
Another 23% of the observations are in regime N, in which the 
outcome is an interior Nash bargain. The remaining 21% of the 
cases are in regime U**, where the union receives its outside 
option.
These figures are consistent with the shrinking employment 
levels over time in the sample. The sharp increase in the 
unemployment rate in the manufacturing sector during the 70’s and 
early 80’s is likely to have created unfavourable conditions for 
unions. One would consequently expect to find a high proportion 
of observations in which firms realise their outside option.
The change over time in the composition of firms also reflects 
aggregate indicators of the labour market (see Table 3). Inflows 
have risen in 1975 and again in 1980-81, and correspondingly 
there has been an increase in the proportion of firms in 11°. A
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rise in the number of firms in TT° has also been experienced in 
1977-78, in which outflows have fallen. The proportion of 
observations in TT° relative to U° has instead fallen in 1976 and 
1979 (decrease in inflows) and in 1982 (increase in outflows).
In Tables 4a and 4b the transitions between regimes are 
reported. If a unit is in 11° at time t, in more than 52 per cent 
of cases the same unit will be in TT° at time t+1 as well. If an 
observation is in N or U°, however, it is more likely to shift to 
TT° in the following period than to remain in the same regime.
The allocation of firms to the different regimes seems thus to 
be tracing fairly closely the behaviour of aggregate flows into 
and out of unemployment. It is thus reasonable to rely upon the 
proposed sample separation rule as the starting point for the 
empirical analysis.
5. Econometric estimation
The bargaining locus has been estimated by making use of the 
following specification (lower case letters denote logs):
+ y u^ + y (d-e) + time dummies + e
10 l,t-l 11 i,t-i it
where w are real wages, k is the capital stock, n the level of
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employment, TI profits, the industry wage, the industry
unemployment rate, (d-e) the debt/equity ratio and the symbol A
denotes the first difference operator. The dependent variable is 
average remuneration of all domestic employee, adjusted for
cyclical overtime as explained in Appendix B.Care has been taken 
in endogenizing the current and lagged values of the
capital/labour ratio and profits per employee and the lagged
values of wages, employment, and the debt/equity ratio.
Instruments are the excluded variables, twice lagged levels of 
the endogenous variables, industry union density (possibly 
related to bargaining strength), and financial variables
(possibly related to profits).
Empirical estimates of the wage equation are presented in
Tables 5-7b. Table 5 presents the estimates (15a)-(15d)
corresponding to the initial allocation of firms. The hypothesis
that the coefficients are the same for all regimes is clearly
rejected: F(31,1853)=3.280. The most interesting finding is the
behaviour of the industry wage. The coefficient is very high and
very precisely determined in the outside options, 11° and U°,
whereas it is much lower and insignificant in the interior
regime, N. In principle, the industry wage might appear in N via
the union’s objective function. However, the empirical estimates
clearly indicate that industry wages are crucial for the outside
options. Profits per employee, by contrast, are only significant
in N. Also, the differences between intercepts across regimes
have the expected sign although they do not appear to be
0 0
significant, i.e. . Union density was not
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significant when included amongst the regressors. This may be due 
to the fact that actual changes in density over the period where 
not closely related to changes in the effective group of 
"members", which are maybe better explained by lagged employment. 
The change in industry unemployment is significant in TT°, but
also in N. This is not what one would expect from the theory, and
might simply reflect the possibility that industry unemployment 
affects the relative strength of the union in bargaining. The 
debt/equity ratio is correctly signed at U° only^^. A slightly 
disturbing feature of the results is that the Sargan criterion 
for the orthogonality of the instruments to the errors is 
marginally significant at 1%.
Table 6 gives a more parsimonious version of the wage
equation. The coefficient on the industry wage in the interior 
regime has been set to zero. Similarly, profits per head and the 
debt-equity ratio are restricted not to appear at the outside 
options, and industry unemployment is excluded from U°. These 
values are takes as the starting point for evaluating the
probabilities p^^ and re-estimate the parameters as described in 
(16a)-(16d).
A technical problem however arises when recomputing the 
estimates with the new probability weights. Since the estimated
^^Other financial variables, such as cash/liabilities ratio and 
market valuation ratio, were found to be insignificant after 
controlling for simultaneity.
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standard error from Table 6 is large relative to the terms 
X* y^-x' which are required to calculate the posterior
it i,t-i
probabilities^^, the estimates are bound to be contaminated by 
serious collinearity. Hence, the estimates which entirely rely on 
the posterior probabilities are not very meaningful.
In order to overcome this problem, a sensitivity analysis was 
performed by making use of a system of weights defined as 
follows:
where A=0.1,0.2,. . . ,0. 9. The parameter A can be interpreted as a 
measure of the relative weight attached to the a priori 
allocation of the observations across the regimes.
Tables 7a and 7b report the estimation results for A=0.7 and 
A=0.3 respectively. The main features of the initial allocation 
tend to be replicated in each case. The coefficients on industry 
wages are always very large and significant at the outside 
options, whereas profits per employee are significant at the 
interior regime.
The employment equation reported in Table 8 has the following 
log-linearised form:
(19) =  3^ + V " i t  * V i . t - i
^^See Appendix C.
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+ 5 u' + 5  Ap' + 6 p + time dummies + t)
11 l,t-l 12 13*^ 1,t-1 it
where is industry output. The dependent variable is the total 
number of domestic employees (both men and women). Current and 
lagged wages are instrumented, and so is n The equation above 
is similar to Nickel1 and Wadhwani's (1988) employment equation. 
The hypothesis that the coefficients are the same across regimes 
is easily accepted: F(35,1881) = 0.501. The capital stock, which 
identifies the rent sharing equation, is highly significant both 
in its current difference and in its lagged level. Own real wages 
have a negative sign, albeit not significantly so. Industry 
unemployment is negative as expected and well determined.
Industry output is positive, and so is the index of industry 
price. Industry wages are positive, but not significant. As noted 
by Nickell and Wadhwani (1988), it would not be easy to
rationalise a positive significant coefficient in terms of a 
bargaining model. Their preferred explanation for such a finding 
would rely on efficiency wage considerations. Lagged market
valuation and debt-equity ratio were tried but they are both
insignificant, after controlling for endogeneity. The marginal 
significance level of the Sargan criterion is greater than
2. 5%.
The problems encountered when separating the regimes by making 
use of the posterior probabilities only are illustrated in Table 
9, which shows the breakdown of the estimated number of firms
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across regimes and over time. The distribution of the 
observations in the whole sample is not very different from that 
obtained with the initial allocation (see Table 2), although the 
proportion of firms in TT° is now somewhat lower. Particularly 
sharp is the result for 1981, with almost all observations 
predicted to be in TI°. However, the estimates pertaining to the 
other time periods are much less well differentiated. Hence, 
there is not enough variability in the sample to make it feasible 
to obtain a precise characterization of the regimes on the basis 
of endogenous information only.
6. Conclusions
This paper sets forth and tests a model of bargaining in which 
firm and workers are only constrained by the other party's 
outside options if these are credible. The observations in the 
sample have been allocated to different regimes consistently with 
the notion that the opportunity cost of investing in capital 
stock and inventories depends on the prevailing bargaining 
regime.
The main results are the following.
(i) The rent sharing behaviour exhibits structural breaks.
(ii) There is (indirect) evidence that investment decisions 
are affected by the bargaining regime.
(iii) The industry-wide wage level is a crucial determinant of 
wages in the outside options, but not in the interior
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regime.
(iv) Profits per employee are mainly important in the interior 
regime.
(v) In the sample period here considered, wage and employment 
determination has largely been driven by factors external 
to the firm.
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Appendix A - The data
Employment, n. Number of domestic employees, EXSTAT item no. CIS.
Wages, w. Remuneration of domestic employees (EXSTAT item no. 
C16)/Number of domestic employees.
Capital stock, k. Gross capital stock at current cost, from 
Wadhwani and Wall (1986).
Output, y. Sales/turnover, EXSTAT item no. C31.
Output price, p^ . Data constructed by S. Wadhwani and M. Wall 
(1988b). Trade and Industries until 1979 and British Business 
from 1980. Weights are given in Wholesales Prices Index: 
Principles and Procedures, CSO, 1980.
Unemployment rate by industry, u^ . Department of Employment 
Gazette.
Industry wage, w^ . Department of Employment Gazette.
Price of materials, pm^. Price of stocks held as materials or 
fuel. Price Indices for Current Cost Accounting, CSO.
Market capitalization of equities. Datastream, item HMV.
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Union density, u^ . Industry-specific union density, data provided 
by Paul Kong, University of Oxford.
Debt-equity ratio, d-e. (Total loan capital+borrowing repayable 
within 1 year)/(total equity capital and reserves + deferred tax 
less goodwill), Datastream, item 733.
Industry output, y^ . Real output per industry. Monthly Digest of 
Statistics, CSO.
Cash, m. Cash ratio: (total cash and equivalent)/ (total current
liabilities), Datastream, item 743.
Expected change in output, AQ*. Expected trend over the next four 
months with regard to the volume of output, excluding seasonal 
variation, CBI Industrial Trends Survey.
Expected change in Capital Expenditure, A^. Expected 
authorization of more or less capital expenditure in the next 
twelve months than in the previous twelve months (plant and 
machinery), CBI Industrial Trends Survey.
Expected change in stocks of finished goods, AEG. Expected trend 
over the next four months with regard to volume of stocks of 
finished goods, CBI Industrial Trends Survey.
Unemployment inflows and outflows. Department of Employment,
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unpublished data.
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Appendix B - Cyclical correction of the wages series
(i) CSO data on product per head has been matched with the 
CBI Industrial Trends Survey on capacity/plant constraints. Let j 
denote the industrial subsector (metals, chemicals, engineering 
and allied industries, food drink and tobacco, textiles, other 
manufacturing). Then industry-specific cyclical factors were 
estimated as follows (1969-1986):
= “oj“ > +
where a^^(t) is a cubic polynomial of time. The industry cyclical 
residual is thus
“jt =
(ii) Next, data from the DOE New Earnings Survey is used:
E: gross weekly earnings (excluded those who were affected by 
absence)
w: average weekly hours (normal + overtime)
'Normal' earnings are defined as follows:
wN = 
Jt
40 + 5*1.3
40 + (Hj^-40)*1.3
(ill) We have then combined u^^ from (i) and (wN/E)^^ from (ii)
to estimate , /3 and p :0 1 '^ 2
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A  ,
wN
T
Jt
(iv) The CSO industrial sector classification is matched with
EXSTAT to run the following estimates at the firm level 
(1972-82):
where y^tt) is a quadratic polynomial. The firm-specific cyclical 
residual is thus constructed:
"it = t=72.....82
Using u^^ from (i) it is possible to estimate
u = ô + ô u  + Ô U  
it 0 1 i,t+l 2 Jt
t=72,...,81
and then backcast
u = ô + ô u  + Ô U  
1,71 0 1 1,72 2 J,71
(v) The corrected wages series was finally constructed:
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In(wN) = ln(E) + P + 6 u + fi u , t=72.... 82
It It O 1 it 2 l,t-l
where are taken from step (ill) (Industry-specific
coefficients) and are taken from (Iv) (firm-specific
cyclical residuals).
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Appendix C - Computation of the regime probabilities
Equations (12a)-(12c) and (13) in the text for wages can be 
written as
(Cl)
“it =
where
1 if
0 otherwise
h=TT,N,U. Upon taking first differences,
(C2) = I ^ --1“ ■ -)
h h ,h he -d eh it it i,t-l i,t-l
h h
Given the assumptions on e it follows that Y ( d eit Mi it it
d^ e^ ) ~ N(0,2<r^). Hence, i,t-i i,t-i e
(C3) Pr(w"^<w^^) = Pricl-c'l<
= $
Vz cr
= $
nn 7TU
VI
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where s x’ - x’ (when estimating the model in theIt It 1,t-i ®
differenced form (C2), the integrating factor for the level of 
wages can no longer be identified). Similarly,
(C4) = $
 ^ U^TT ^nn
✓i
We can now determine Pr(d^^)=l, s=t-l,t; h=TT,N,U. Starting with 
d^, notice first that
(C5)
Vz O' 
and therefore
0
~ N
0
*
1 - 1 /2  
1 /2 1
(C6) Pr(w^<w"<w**) = Pr(c"-c*<x'y*-x'y", c*-c^<x'y^-x'y*J
= $
, 7T , U 
X y - X y
0
, N ,71
X y - X y
_
Vz (T Vz cr
. 0 
- 1/2
x'y* - x'y" x'y^ - x'y*
Vz Vz
; z dz
by making use of the following relationship (see e.g. Cramer and 
Leadbetter, 1967):
(C7)
. a
#(x,y;p) dxdy = $(a) $(b) +
r P
#(a,b;z) dz
0^0 0^0
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From (C6), one obtains
(C8) Pr(w^ <w^ <w** ) = $
It it it
nn nu 1 f TIN ITTT
w - w w -  W
it it
$
it it
Vz <r Vz <rK
<t>
■1/2
nn 7TU TIN nn
/z (T
dz
and
(C9) -  $
un nn ] f nn Nn
w - w w - w
it it
$
i t it
Vz <r Vz <r
0
(p
1/2
 ^ ''UTC "nn
".t - "it
✓i
nn Nn 
"it - "it
✓i
dz
whence
(CIO) Pr(d“^=l)
nn nu
✓i
and
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n
(Cil) Pr(d" =1)
i, t-i
"'■T.-'"
respectively. In an analogous fashion one obtains
it
f nn nu 1 w - w
= $ i t it
V2 <r
-1
f 7TN 7TU 1w -  w ' 1
$ it it $ it it
V2 (T Vz cr  ^ /
r f 7TN "nuw, -  w C"" -  C""
' ■
i t  i t I t  11
Vz O'
z dz
- 1/2 / z  cr J
f un "nn 1w -  w
= $ i t  i t
Vz cr
-1
it it
V2
' C "  - C""
it i t
VI
r
C "  -  C"" 1
-
i t  i t i t  i t
v'i cr
; z dz
J -1/2 v'i cr
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(C14) Pr(d^^=l) = $
 ^''nn T^TU
-1
 ^ i^ru ''nn
VI
 ^ ''nn ''nu
0
-1/2
 ^ "nu "ttn
V I
(CIS) Pr(d
i,t-i
f U7T nn 1 
w - w
$
it i t
=
V2 cr
NTt uir
V~2
<t>
■1/2
 ^ '"NTT '"U7T
V I cr
"nn T^TU
w w
it it
V I cr
-1
"nn
W w
it it
V I <r
"un "nn
w w
it i t
V I V I
dz
; z dz
The probabilities (CIO)-(CIS) can finally be computed by 
numerical integration.
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Figure 1 - The Constrained Contract Curve
W A
TT
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Table 1 - Sample separation rule
AQ*'A^K
> 0
AQ* AFG
< 0
> 0 I (n°) II (N)
< 0 III (U°)
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Table 2 - Number of firms in each regime per year 
(row percentages in brackets)
n* N U*
1974 117 45 48 210
(56) (21) (23)
1975 147 20 43 210
(70) (10) (20)
1976 51 70 89 210
(24) (33) (42)
1977 164 44 2 210
(78) (21) (1)
1978 142 38 32 212
(67) (18) (15)
1979 62 75 77 214
(29) (35) (36)
1980 132 59 24 215
(61) (27) (11)
1981 203 5 4 212
(96) (2) (2)
1982 45 78 83 206
(22) (38) (40)
Total 1063 434 402 1899
(56) (23) (21)
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Table 3 - Unemployment flows 
(thousands)
Year Inflows Outflows
1974 2,969 2,843
1975 3,354 2,957
1976 2,970 2,941
1977 2,917 2,903
1978 2,308 2,398
1979 2, 197 2,245
1980 2,709 2,061
1981 2,678 2,288
1982 2,718 2,562
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Table 4a - Transition matrix
Initial regime 
(t)
Final regime 
(t+1)
N u"
631 304 264 1199
N 276 50 54 380
U° 156 80 84 320
1063 434 402 1899
(56%) (23%) (21%)
Table 4b - Conditional transition frequencies (per cent)
Initial regime Final regime
(t)
n°
(t+1)
N u"
52. 63 25.35 22. 02
N 72. 63 13. 16 14.21
u" 48.75 25.00 26.25
100.00 
100.00 
100.00
- 62 -
Table 5 - Unrestricted wage equation
Dependent variable: w N U*
-0.008 -0.084 -0.043
k-n"^
(0.071) (0.706) (0.348)
0.012 0.014 0.015
n/N'^
(0.620) (0.709) (0.747)
0. 019 0.030 0.014
(1.456) (2.145) (1.072)
0. 119 0. 116 0. 122
(2.753) (2.661) (2.792)
w' 0. 324 0.052 0. 439
(2.566) (0.246) (2.828)
Au^ -0.039 -0.124 -0.003
(d-e)
(2.822) (4.112) (0.085)
0. 016 0. 049 -0.019
(0.488) (1.220) (0.435)
0. 204 0. 007 -
(1.259) (0.036) —
<r 0. 072
Sargan (36) 60.324
F(31,1853)j,o^^^yO 3.280
F(16,1853)jj^^jO 5. 022
F(17,1853)_o „ 
n =N
3. 330
Note: Absolute t-ratios in parenthesis. A dagger (-[-) over a
symbol indicates that the variable has been instrumented. The 
equation includes time dummies. The regime specific intercept is 
denoted by
Additional instruments: industry output, industry price, price of 
materials, industry union density, cash liability ratio, twice 
lagged levels of endogenous variables.
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Table 6 - Restricted wage equation
Dependent variable: w n* N U*"
w + 0.014 -0.073 -0.053-1
(0.146) (0.745) (0.535)
k-n^ 0.019 0.021 0.019
(1.025) (1.138) (1.018)
Tl/U^ - 0.011 -
- (2.882) -
n + 0. 124 0. 120 0. 125-1
(3.223) (3.115) (3.228)
w' 0.356 - 0. 490
(3.561) - (4.003)
Au’ -0.043 -0.130 -
(3.483) (4.535) -
(d-e) "t" 0. 035 —-1
- (1.993) -
0.349 0. 140
0 0
O'
Sargan (36)
F(31,1853)nO=H=u°
F(16,1853)^^yO
F(17,1853)j^o^^
(2.431)
0.071
67.592
6.319
7.816
4.302
(0.868)
Note: As for Table 5.
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Table 7a - Probability-weighted wage equation 
(\ = 0.7)
Dependent variable: w n° N U*
w + 0.219 0. 103 0.205-1
k-n^
(2.781) (1.333) (3.322)
0.014 0. 019 0.010
n/N^
(0.708) (0.955) (0.515)
- 0.013 -
n +
- (2.240) -
0.033 0.026 0.031-1
(1.162) (0.929) (1.102)
w' 0.342 - 0. 408
(2.823) - (2.625)
6u' -0.003 -0.086 -
(d-e) ^
(0.170) (2.325) -
0.051-1
- (1.827) -
h U* 
r -7 0.074 -0.2320 0
(T
Sargan (36)
F(31,1853)nO=M=u°
F(16.1853)jj^yO
F(17,1853)nO=H
(0.378)
0.078 
65.230 
4. 155 
5.454 
3.560
(0.966)
Note: As for Table 5.
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Table 7b - Probability-weighted wage equation 
(X = 0.3)
Dependent variable: w n° N U*
w + 0.081 -0.004 0.031-1
(0.848) (0.041) (0.324)
k-n^ 0.009 0.012 0. 008
(0.501) (0.623) (0.423)
n/N^ - 0.011 -
- (2.531) -
n + 0.085 0.081 0.085-1
(2.373) (2.246) (2.368)
w' 0.310 - 0.455
(3.013) - (3.524)
Au’ -0.043 -0.125 -
(d-e)
(3.003) (3.965) -
0.034-1
- (1.775) -
h U° 
y -y 0.274 0. 064G 0
(T
Sargan (36)
F(31,1853)nO=H=u°
F(16.1853)j^^^o
F(17,1853)nO=H
(1.770)
0.072
71.771
6.018
7.550
3.967
(0.361)
Note: As for Table 5.
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Table 8 - Employment equation
Dependent variable: n
n + 0.252
-1
(3.447)
Ak 0.262
(15.031)
k 0.313-1
(9.655)
Aw^” -0.153
(1.553)
w + -0.179-1
(1.546)
Iw 0. 163-1
(1.250)
Ay^ 0. 158
(4.190)
y\ 0.067-1
(1.226)
Iu -0.132
(5.071)
Ap' 0.033
(2.409)
O' 0.088
Sargan (73) 93.241
F(35,1881)nO=w=uO 0.501
Note: As for Table 5.
Additional instruments: profits per head, industry union density, 
cash/liabilities ratio, price of materials, market valuation 
ratio, debt/equity ratio, twice lagged levels of endogenous 
variables.
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Table 9 - Estimated number of firms in each regime per year 
(row percentages in brackets)
n° N U°
1974 58 71 81 210
(28) (34) (38)
1975 97 68 45 210
(46) (32) (22)
1976 69 68 73 210
(33) (32) (35)
1977 75 66 69 210
(36) (31) (33)
1978 84 76 52 212
(40) (36) (24)
1979 84 73 57 214
(39) (34) (27)
1980 71 73 71 215
(33) (34) (33)
1981 173 32 7 212
(82) (15) ( 3)
1982 77 67 62 206
(37) (33) (30)
Total 788 594 517 1899
(42) (31) (27)
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CHAPTER 2
LABOUR BARGAINING, EFFICIENCY WAGES, AND UNION MEMBERSHIP
1. Introduction
In the previous chapter a model of labour bargaining has been 
set out and tested. Since the emphasis was mainly upon empirical 
applications, the degree of complexity of the model has been kept 
at a minimum. The analytical form of the union objective function 
and the status quo and outside options of the parties have been 
restricted in order to allow the identification of the underlying 
equations. It has thus been possible to develop a simple model 
which generates sharp testable predictions.
It is important, however, to investigate whether the results 
which were obtained critically depend on the assumed 
specifications, or whether the findings are robust with respect 
to more general characterizations of the analytical set-up. While 
it is clearly not possible to test the identifying restrictions 
per se, it is however feasible to relax some of the restrictive 
assumptions and contrast the comparative statics predictions with 
those of the simple model.
The present chapter follows three main directions of research. 
First, a more general union objective function is analyzed 
(section 2). It is assumed that the union is concerned not only 
with the utility of its currently employed members, which was a 
maintained hypothesis in chapter 1, but cares about its
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unemployed members as well. Secondly, it is relaxed the
assumption that workers are all identical and hence have the same 
outside option. When workers have a variety of reservation wages, 
they will leave the firm if the bargained outcome is less
satisfactory than their outside option. But if, following Weiss 
(1980), workers' ability is positively correlated with their 
reservation wage, then the productivity implications of
alternative wage settlements must be taken into account by
rational firms and unions. Efficient bargains must thus be 
combined with efficiency wages considerations (section 3).
Finally, some implications of the previous analysis upon union 
membership are explored. If the status quo position for the union 
is identified with its outside option, it is possible to show 
that, for a variety of specifications of union objectives, 
membership plays no direct role (e.g. Farber (1986)). This 
statement no longer holds true, however, once a distinction is 
made between status quo and outside options. But if membership 
matters, and its size is endogenous and depends upon the 
negotiated outcome, then a question is whether an optimal size 
exists which maximizes the union objective function. These issues 
are analyzed in section 4. Section 5 provides a summary and draws 
some conclusions.
2. Union objective function and bargaining outcome
In the empirical research carried out in chapter 1 the union 
is assumed to maximize the utility rents to its employed members
— 70 —
(equation (1.4)). This is a generalization of Dunlop’s (1944) 
wage bill argument. However, the objective there used can be 
regarded as restrictive since it does not express any concern for 
the utility of the unemployed members. In the present section, by 
contrast, it is assumed that the union maximizes the expected 
utility of its representative member under a random layoff rule. 
It is shown that this generates some paradoxical effects from 
union size.
The objective function for the union is
(1) U(W,N) = ^-U(W) + ^ ' U ( W )
where W is the wage, N the level of employment, M membership, W 
the certainty equivalent wage level for an unemployed worker, and 
where U’(*)>0, U"(*)<0, U ’(W)->oo as W~>0, and U ’(W)—>0 as W~>». 
Equation (1) possesses the appealing feature of being consistent 
with aggregation over individual members’ preferences. An 
alternative behavioural assumption for the union holds that the 
sum of the utilities of its members is maximized:
(1’) V(W,N) = N-U(W) + (M-N)'U(W)
Utility (1’ ) can be regarded as appropriate when redistribution 
takes place within the union. For all the purposes of the present 
section, the objective functions (1) and (1’) are equivalent. 
Therefore one can limit oneself to the case of an 
expected-utility union (equation (1)). The implications of U(*,*)
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and V(',') are however very different once membership is 
endogenised. In section 4 both functional forms are discussed and 
their contrasting predictions are analysed.
The union maximizes the objective function (1). While 
bargaining, workers receive the utility level U (status quo). The 
outside option coincides with the utility of the unemployed 
members of the union:
(2) U = U(W)
The firm maximizes profits:
(3) n(W,N) = P-F(N) - WN
where P is the output price and F(*) satisfies the Inada 
conditions. The status quo position and outside option are 
respectively equal to TT and TT°
The (symmetric) Nash bargaining between firm and union is
(4) max
(W,N)
M M_M —
^ U(W) + ^  U(W) - u [P-F(N) - WN - n]
subject to
The differences in specification relative to chapter 2 serve the 
purpose of simplifying the notation, and involve no loss in 
generality.
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(5a) S [U(W) - U(W)) + U(W) 2: U° M
(5b) PF(N) - WN 2: n°
In the light of (2), equation (5a) becomes simply 
(5a' ) W 2: W
Let A and p be the non-negative Kuhn-Tucker multipliers 
pertaining to constraints (5a’) and (5b) respectively. The 
first-order conditions are
(6a) NU’(W)[PF(N)-WN-TT] - [NU(W)+(M-N)U(W)-MU]N + A - pN = 0
(6b) [U(W)-U(W)1[PF(N)-WN-ii] + [NU(W)+(M-N)U(W)-MU][PF’(N)-W]
+ p-[PF’(N)-W] = 0
(6c) A-[W-W] = 0
(6d) p-[PF(N)-WN-n°] = 0
As in chapter 1, three cases may arise according as to whether 
the parties are at an interior solution (A=p=0) or whether either 
constraint is binding (A>0 or p>0). These cases are now 
considered in turn.
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(i) Interior solution (X=fi=0) 
The first-order conditions are
(7a)  ^ ----- Z --------- ^ . 0
N[U(W)-U(W)]+M[U(W)-U] PF(N)-WN-n
(7b) +  L _  = 0
U(W)-U(W) PF’(N)-W
Equation (7a) is the bargaining locus, whereas equation (7b) is 
the contract curve. From inspection of (7b) one can notice that 
an interior solution requires PF’(N)-W<0. Furthermore, from (7b) 
one has
where h(*) = (F’)~^(*). Given the Inada properties of F(-), this 
implies that necessary condition for the existence of an interior 
solution is
U(W)-U(W)
i.e. the wage elasticity of the utility gain from employment must 
be greater than unity. By taking total differentials one obtains
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(8a) {U"[PF-WN-n]-2NU*> dW + 2U’[PF’-W] dN =
= [(M-N)U' (W)] dW + U’ dlT - M dû - U’F dP + (U-Ü) dM
(8b) U"[PF’-W] dW + U’ PF" dN = U’(W) dW - U’F’ dP
In matrix notation,
(9)
■ dW ■
(!)
dN
b b b b b,11 ,12 ,13 ,14 ,11( + ) (+T (-) (-) ( +
%
0 0
(!)
0
dW
dÏÏ
dû
dP
dM
The bargaining locus BL is thus negatively sloped on the (N,W) 
plane, whilst the contract curve CC has a positive slope (Fig. 
1). The comparative statics results are
dH 0 . ^ > 0 .  ^ ^ 0 .  ^ < 0
dW  ^ dn dU dP  ^ dM
^  < 0 , ^  < 0 , ^  > 0 , ^  > 0 , ^  < 0
dW dn dU dP dM
Increases in the alternative wage W have an unclear effect on 
wages, whilst unambiguously depressing the level of employment.
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Formally, this is due to the fact that both the BL and the CC
curves are shifted to the left. Increases in the status quo of
the firm and the union respectively exert opposite effects, the
former reducing, and the latter increasing, both W and N.
Increases in the firm's output price P (which can be interpreted
as a firm-specific shift factor) increase N, while their effect
2
on the bargained wage is unclear .
The most intriguing, and apparently paradoxical, result is 
that an increase in union membership should decrease both wages 
and employment. This is an unambiguous prediction of the model. 
It necessarily follows from the fact that an increase in union 
size shifts the BL curve to the left whilst leaving the position 
of the CC schedule unaffected (see Fig. 1). From the rent sharing 
equation (7a) one can see that, given the alternative wage, an 
increase in membership plays a similar role as a worsening in the 
union’s status quo. As M rises, the level of utility gains to the 
union increases. The marginal increase in utility from reaching a 
settlement must therefore increase as well, and this is 
accomplished through a decrease in wage for any level of 
employment. Conversely, for any given wage, the increase in
^It is possible to show that dW/dP>0 iff
W < PF’(N) _ 1 F(N) NF"(N) 
2 NF’(N) F’(N) ^PF-(N) [ 1 - 1
The response of wages to changes in the output price is thus a 
function of the degree of concavity of the production technology.
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utility following a rise in membership must be offset by a 
decrease in employment.
(ii) Outside option binding for the union: U=U° (A>0, p=0)
The first-order conditions are:
(10a) [U(W)-U]•[PF’(N)-W] = 0
(10b) W = W
Substituting (10b) into (10a), and since U(W)>U by assumption, 
one obtains
(11) F’(N) = ^
Employment thus lies on the labour demand schedule. It should be 
noticed that equation (11) does not characterize the competitive 
outcome, since W is not the competitive wage but the certainty 
equivalent wage for an unemployed worker. The union size is 
irrelevant to the bargained outcome.
(iii) Outside option binding for the firm: TT=TI° (A=0, p=0)
The first-order conditions give
(12a) [U(W)-U(W)1 + U’(W)[PF’(N)-W] = 0
- 77 -
(12b) PF(N) - WN = n°
Equation (12a) is the contract curve and equation (12b) is the 
outside option for the firm. It is immediately seen that the 
union size has no effect upon wages and employment when workers 
have to concede the firm its outside option. Comparative statics 
gives
aw < 0, aw > 0, dw , 0
dn° dW dP
dN < o_ dN < 0
dn° dW dP
An improvement in the firm’s outside option worsens the 
wage-employment combinations which the union can attain. An 
increase in the alternative wage raises the equilibrium wage and 
lowers employment, whilst the opposite happens if the firm’s 
output price increases^.
One of the main results of the analysis of this section is 
that, under an expected utility objective function for the union, 
increases in the size of the latter must bring about a reduction 
of both wages and employment. The reason for this is that
^If one writes n°=TT°(W), TI°’(*)<0, then the comparative statics
results become dW/dW>0, dN/dW&O.
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membership affects the average surplus of the union to a smaller 
extent than its marginal surplus. Rearranging (7a) one obtains
(7a' )  U' (W)/M______  _ 1
~ [U(W)-U(W)1 + [U(W)-U] PF(N)-WN-n
From (7a’ ) it is apparent that a ceteris paribus increase in 
membership by itself brings about a reduction of the marginal 
gains from a wage increase that is larger than the overall 
dilution of the utility surplus. In fact, the decrease in total 
surplus only involves the fraction of the labour force which is 
employed. Hence, the rent-sharing condition requires that 
increases in membership be compensated for by a decrease in wage. 
A similar argument would apply to the level of employment.
A utilitarian union would have its payoff increased by a rise 
in membership, for given employment and wages. The rent sharing 
equilibrium condition at the margin again requires a fall in 
wages and employment. Hence, both an expected utility and a 
utilitarian objective function lead to the disturbing prediction 
that larger unions should bring about lower wages and employment.
These implications about the effects of membership necessarily 
follow from assuming an expected utility, or a utilitarian, 
objective function for the union. Hence, it seems one can be 
justified in assuming utility rents maximization, as in the 
previous chapter.
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3. Efficiency wages and bargaining
In the analysis of chapter 1 and in the previous section it 
has been assumed throughout that workers were all identical. In 
particular, they are endowed with the same productive 
characteristics and have the same market opportunities available 
to them. This may seem to be a very restrictive assumption. It is 
certainly realistic to acknowledge that workers have unequal 
ability and face different outside market alternatives. At the 
limit, there might exist a continuum of outside options for 
workers according to their productive potential.
In the present section, 1 extend the bargaining model 
previously developed in order to allow for the possibility that 
workers face different outside options. 1 follow Weiss (1980) in 
postulating that wage remuneration cannot be made contingent upon 
individual performance. Each worker's ability is however 
positively correlated with his/her reservation wage. Following a 
decrease in the wage paid by the firm, the best workers would 
quit and labour productivity would be adversely affected. This 
decrease in average productivity might offset the positive 
effects on the firm’ s profits of a reduction in the wage bill. 
In a bargaining framework, these quality composition effects on 
labour productivity must be taken into account by rational agents 
when negotiating over wages and employment.
Labour heterogeneity can be formalized as in Weiss (1980). Let 
G(W) be the cumulative distribution of workers by their 
reservation wage, and let q(W) be individual productivity (where
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q(‘) satisfies the Inada conditions). The average productivity of 
the workforce as a function of the wage, Z(W), is then given by*
1IWq(v)dG(v)0
(13) Z(W) = ---
G(W)
where Z’(*)>0 and where Z"(•) is assumed to be negative over the 
relevant range (see Appendix A for a discussion of the necessary 
and sufficient condition for Z"(*)<0).
The technology is described by the production function
(14) Y=F[Z(W)*N]
Hence expected profits are given by^
(15) n(W,N) = P-F[Z(W)N] - WN
In the formal characterization of the bargaining structure, 
workers have a continuum of outside options. Since the analysis
*One could easily modify equation (13) in order to allow the firm 
to control the lower bound of workers' ability, e.g. via a 
pass-fail test.
®Due to Jensen’s inequality, expression (15) in the text is only 
valid as an approximation.
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is mainly concerned with the behaviour of the parties at an 
interior solution, the outside option of the firm is neglected. 
Also, for notational simplicity the status quo positions of the 
firm and the union are both normalized to zero: TT=U=0.
An important assumption concerns the union objective function. 
For consistency with the analysis developed in the previous 
section, an expected utility function is adopted*. In what 
follows, the union size is independent of W. Workers who choose 
not to be hired by the firm because of low wages remain 
nevertheless members of the union. A possible Justification for 
this is that membership is here properly identified with the 
labour pool from which the firm can randomly hire its employees, 
rather than with the formal group of fee-paying members. A 
different value of W, whilst effectively truncating the 
distribution of actual workers, does not alter the distribution 
of potential job applicants.
The Nash bargaining problem is
(16) max 
(W,N)
{P-F[Z(W)N] - WN>
where W is a measure of the alternative wage for laid off
*The implications of considering an objective function of the 
form N-[V(W) - V(W)], as in the previous chapter, are presented 
in Appendix D.
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workers^. The first-order conditions for an interior solution can 
be written as:
(17a) U ’(W){PF[Z(W)N1-WN> + [NU(W)+(M-N)U(W)]<PZ’(W)F’[Z(W)N]-1> 
=  0
(17b) [U(W)-U(W)]{PZ'(W)F'[Z(W)N]-1> - U'(W){PZ(W)F'[Z(W)N]-W>
=  0
It is easy to verify that (17a) and (17b) would collapse to the 
corresponding equations (7a) and (7b) for the case of homogeneous 
workers if one sets Z'(W)=0 and Z(W)=1, i.e. if one rules out the 
efficiency wage effect upon productivity and normalizes the 
efficiency parameter to unity. The first-order conditions imply
(18) PF' < min
Equation (17b) can be rewritten as
^It should be noticed that this measure is taken to be 
independent of the bargained outcome. This assumption requires 
that the opportunity set of the unemployed members of the union 
is different from that of workers who voluntarily quit.
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'^ = Z W  [ 1 + tPZ'F’-l) ] }
where h(•) = (F* )~^  ( • ). Existence of an interior solution therefore 
requires
WU’
—  > 1 - PZ'F' 
U-U
Since Z’>0, this condition is less stringent than the
corresponding inequality for identical workers (obtained by
setting Z'=0).
The absolute value of the marginal rate of substitution
between wages and employment for the firm is
dN
^ PZF'-W 
(PZ'F'-l)N
dIT=0
which implies that, for a given wage and employment combination, 
the slope of the indifference schedules tends to be smaller the 
larger is the strength of the efficiency wage effect, as 
expressed by the marginal increase in expected average 
productivity Z. The isoprofit lines tend thus to be more wage 
elastic than in the absence of labour heterogeneity.
By taking total differentials of (17a) and (17b) one has
(19a) <U"(PF-WN)+2NU'(PZ'F'-1)+[N(U-U)+MU][PZ"F'+P(Z')^NF"]>dW
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+ {2U’(PZF’-W)+[N(U-U)+MU]PZZ’F"} dN 
= - (M-N)U’(PZ’F’-l) dW - <U'F+[N(U-U)+MU]Z'F'} dP 
- U(PZ'F'-l) dM
(19b) {U" (PZF’-W)-(U-U) [PZ"F’+PN(Z’)^F"]+U’PZZ’NF"} dW
+ {U’PzV'-(U-U)PZZ’F"> dN 
= - (PZ'F'-1)0' dW + [(U-U)Z'F'-U'ZF'] dP
More compactly,
(20)
(1!
■ dW '
^1 ^ 2  -
dN
(+/-) (+/— )
Ô Ô Ô
(li (i? (J?
t?{ (!/“  °
■ dW ■
dP
dM
where a <0 since Z"<0. It is immediate to show that sign(a ) 
11 ®  22
[=sign(ô^^)J < 0 iff
WZ'(W)  ^ W U'(W) 
Z(W) U(W)-U(W)
that is, iff
(21) e < e z, w u,w
Thus, a^^ and are negative - as with a homogeneous labour
force - if and only if the wage elasticity of average 
productivity is lower than the wage elasticity of the utility
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from being employed. Clearly, inequality (21) is always satisfied 
if Z'(W)=0.
The coefficient a^  ^ is positive (again, as in the case of 
homogeneous labour) if the following necessary and sufficient 
condition is satisfied®:
(+) (-) 
c e
IT , W 7T, N
'22) Cu.w V h
( + ) ( + ) (- ) (- )
Inequality (22) is not met if e is large. Since e =
v
N T T a n d  TT^^=PZ’(F’+ZNF" )-l, provided F(*) is sufficiently 
concave condition (22) is violated if the efficiency wage effect 
is sufficiently important (i.e. if Z’ is large).
Conditions (21) and (22) do not imply each other. There are no 
restrictions, therefore, that the sign of a^  ^ places upon the 
sign of a^^ and conversely.
Equation (19b) describes the contract curve. It is steeper 
than the corresponding relationship for the case of homogeneous 
labour if the following sufficient condition is met*:
®See Appendix B.
*See Appendix C.
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By comparison of (22) and (23), it follows that a^^<0 implies 
that the CC curve must be steeper than if Z'=0.
Four different configurations of signs of parameter values can 
arise.
Case I: =2,
> 0. ^22
< 0. ^22
< 0
Case II: S.
> 0. ^22
> 0, ^22
> 0
Case III:
=21
< 0, ^22
> 0, ^22
> 0
Case IV: =21
< 0. ^22
< 0. ^22
< 0
The comparative statics implications for each one of these cases 
are now considered in turn.
Case I
The system of total differentials is
a a ■ dW ■ r Ô s Ô
(1} (Î? (i5 (1? (i?
a a dN Ô Ô 0
(2) ^ L (!)
' dW ■
dP
dM
Efficiency wage considerations are not powerful enough to modify 
the sign of any coefficient relative to a situation of 
homogeneous labour. The comparative statics results obtained for 
the interior regime of section 2 apply here as well:
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a* % 0. aw c 0. aw , 0
dW  ^ dP " dM
a% < 0. aw > 0 #  < 0
dW dP dM
Case II
The value of the wage elasticity of average productivity  ^
is large relative to the elasticity of the utility gains from 
being employed. Condition (21) is therefore not satisfied. The 
value of the employment elasticity of marginal profits with 
respect to wages,  ^ is however not large enough to violate
w’
condition (22). Both the BL and CC curves are negatively sloped. 
The sign of the determinant is however ambiguous. Hence, one 
ought to distinguish between two sub-cases.
Sub-case 11(a): A<0
The CC schedule is steeper than the BL curve, since
a /a >a /a (Fig. 2). Comparative statics give 
22 21 12 11 ®  ^
< 0. aw s 0. aw , 0
dW dP  ^ dM
an > 0. aw  ^o, aü ^ ^
dW dP  ^ dM
The most interesting result is that now a larger union does not 
lead to fewer members being employed. The responses to an 
increase in W are a rise in N (consistent with the empirical
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findings of chapter 1) and a fall in W (which is not inconsistent 
with the observed behaviour in the interior regime).
Sub-case 11(b): A>0
The BL curve is steeper than the CC (Fig. 3). The responses of 
wages and employment are now opposite relative to sub-case 11(a):
^  > 0. aw a 0,
dW dP  ^ dM
dN < 0. aw a 0 #  < 0
dW dP dM
Case III
Both e and e are large, and thus neither condition (21)
Z,W 7T^ ,N
nor (22) are satisfied. The determinant A is negative. The BL 
curve is negatively sloped, whilst the CC schedule has a positive 
slope and is steeper than in the absence of efficiency wage 
effects (see conditions (22) and (23)). Comparative statics gives 
(Fig. 4):
< 0, > 0, 0
dW dP dM
> 0,
# > 0,
dN  ^—  < 0
dW dP dM
The only difference relative to case I lies in the responses to
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the external wage W: the wage W should now decrease, whereas the 
effect on N is indeterminate. An increase in W lowers the status 
quo of the union, and the CC shifts downwards to the right. By 
contrast, in case I and in the presence of homogeneous labour the 
CC curve moves to the left.
Case IV
The elasticity c is small, while c is large enough to 
z,w ir^ , N
violate condition (22). Both BL and CC schedule are negatively
sloped. The sign of the determinant is unclear, and thus it is
again necessary to distinguish between two sub-cases.
Sub-case IV(a): A<0
The BL curve is steeper than the CC (Fig. 5). The comparative 
statics is
4M 1 0. aw a 0. ^ > 0
dW dP ‘ dM
Sub-case IV(b): A>0
The BL schedule is flatter than the CC (Fig. 6). The 
comparative statics results are reversed relative to the previous 
sub-case:
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2: 0, 0,
dW dP
#
0,
#
0,
dW dP
< 0
dM
dM
A remarkable result which emerges from the foregoing analysis 
is that, in a number of circumstances, the CC schedule presents a 
negative slope. This is due to the fact that, when efficiency 
wage effects are important, the isoprofit lines for the firm 
become highly wage elastic relative to the union indifference
curves.
The comparative statics properties of equilibrium are altered 
in important ways relative to a situation of homogeneous labour 
force. The direction of the changes depends on the size of the 
efficiency wage effect, as measured by the marginal increase in 
the expected average productivity of labour. If this effect is 
large enough, the firm's concern with the potential adverse
selection of its labour force may offset the positive
implications on profits of decreases in wages.
The introduction of efficiency wage considerations into a
bargaining framework is able to account for some empirical 
findings of the previous chapter, such as a negative relationship 
between the alternative wage and the level of employment. 
However, it does not seem to be generally feasible to assess 
which one of the possible different cases might be the relevant 
one in the actual bargaining situations. Conditions (21) and
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(22), which identify the regimes, depend on unobservable 
elasticities. A direct verification of whether they are satisfied 
does not seem to be feasible.
4. Bargaining outcome and membership
In the previous sections the implications of union size on the 
bargained wages and employment have been analyzed. With 
homogeneous labour, increased membership unambiguously leads to 
lower wages and employment with both a utilitarian and an 
expected utility union. Since the bargained outcome is affected 
by membership, there might exist a union size level which 
maximizes the value of the union objective function. The present 
section aims to explore this issue, for both functional forms (1) 
and (!' )^ °.
The case of homogeneous labour is considered first. It is 
known from section 2 that at an interior solution one has
^°The analysis developed in the text is similar in spirit to the 
account of union membership which has been provided by Grossman 
(1983) and Booth (1984). It differs from those models since there 
labour heterogeneity and a median voter rule are assumed. It also 
differs from Booth and Ulph (1988) since in the present analysis 
the direct effects of the union on the firm's outside option are 
not explicitly considered.
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dW/dM<0, dN/dM<0^^. With an expected utility objective function 
(equation (1)) the optimization programme is:
(24) max U(W,N;M) = ^ U(W) + ^  U(W)
subject to
(25a) W = W(M)
(25b) N = N(M)
(25c) W E W
(25d) n(W,N) 2: n*
(25e) N :s M
with W, TT° exogenously determined. Let v^ , be the
Kuhn-Tucker multipliers pertaining to constraints (25c), (25d)
and (25e) respectively. First-order condition for M is:
ÔU dW ÔU dN au i
|+"l
an dw
aw dM aN dM aM i aw dM
(+)(-) (+)(-) (-) (-) (-)(-)
dM 
( + )
] = 0
The first bracketed term in (26) is negative: hence it must be 
either that is
(27) n[W(M),N(M)] = n°
^^At the outside options the outcome is unaffected by union size.
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or ^^>0, which would imply N=M. Hence, since IT is a positive 
function of M via W and N, the optimal membership is the largest 
value consistent with both conditions that profits be no smaller 
than n° and employment N be no greater than union size.
Let us now consider equation (!'). The maximization problem is
(28) max V(W,N;M) = NU(W) + (M-N)U(W)
(M)
subject to (25a)-(25e). The only qualitative difference between 
programmes (24) and (28) lies in the sign of the partial 
derivative of the objective function with respect to M. This is 
however sufficient to make the maximand in (28) a positive 
function of total membership^^. The constraints on profits, (25d), 
or on size, (25e), are therefore no longer always binding. 
First-order condition for M is now
(29)
av dw ^ av dN ^ av 1 ^ . dw ^ . 
aw dM M  dM âM dM ^ 2
' cMTcw; an dN 1 r
aw dM aN dM J  dM =  0
(+) (-) (+) (+)
The multiplier <(>^ on (25c) must be positive, which implies W=W. 
Then 0g=O (provided the outside options for the firm and the 
union do not happen to be simultaneously verified), and if in 
addition 0^=0 (i.e. N<M) then equation (29) becomes
^^See Appendix E.
(29' )
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ÔW dM ÔN dM
av
aM
that is, the marginal cost from an increase in membership (LHS of 
(29’)) must equal the marginal benefit.
With homogeneous workers, therefore, assuming either an 
expected utility or a utilitarian union yields sharply different 
results, the former leading to lower membership and higher wages 
and employment than the latter.
With heterogeneous workers this prediction carries through to 
Cases I and III of Section 3^ ,^ for which dW/dM<0 and dN/dM<0
still hold true. No general results are available, however, in
cases II and IV, in each of which dW/dM and dN/dM have opposite
sign. The answer in general depends on the degree of curvature of
the utility function relative to the production function and the 
relative strength of the efficiency wage effect.
5. Conclusions
This chapter has extended the bargaining framework developed 
in chapter 1. Alternative union objective functions and labour 
heterogeneity have been allowed for. Some implications of the 
analysis for union size have also been drawn.
*^See Appendix E.
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When the union has an expected utility, or a utilitarian, 
objective function the predicted responses of wages and 
employment to changes in the exogenous variables are largely the 
same as for the case of utility rents maximization considered in 
the previous chapter. A notable exception is represented by the 
responses to changes in union membership, which are seen to exert 
a negative effect upon wages and employment.
The presence of labour heterogeneity is modelled by assuming 
that workers have a continuous variety of outside options. When 
efficient bargains considerations are combined with efficiency 
wages, a number of interesting results arise. The isoprofit loci 
for the firm are shown to be more wage elastic than if labour 
were homogeneous, and the contract curve is vertical in a number 
of circumstances. Depending on the relative strength of the 
efficiency wage effect, the comparative statics properties of the 
equilibrium will differ from the case of absence of 
heterogeneity.
Finally, the dependence of union size upon the bargaining 
outcome has been considered. The results crucially depend on the 
objective function of the union. In particular, an expected 
utility union is shown to lead to a lower membership than a 
utilitarian one.
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Appendix A - Efficiency wages and expected productivity
The expected average productivity of the workforce is given by 
equation (13) in the text. Let g(W)=G’(W): then one has
(Al) Z’(W) = ------
[G(W)]2
[q(W)-q(v)]dG(v)
0
which is positive since q'(')>0. Equation (Al) can alternatively 
be written as
g(W)
(A2) Z’(W) = (q(W)-Z(W)]
By comparison of (Al) and (A2) it follows that q(W)>Z(W) for W>0, 
i.e. the marginal productivity must be greater than the average 
productivity.
The second derivative of Z(W) is
(A3) Z" (W) = ----   / g’(W)[q(W)-Z(W)]G(W) +
[G(W)]= I
+ g(W)[q’(W)-Z’(W)]GtW) + tg(W))^[q(W)-Z(W)l |
« (g’G-g)^(q-Z) + gG(q’-Z')
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W(g-G-g^) W(q’-Z')
gG q-Z
^ W£l _ Wg _ W(q--Z’) 
g G q-Z
which is negative if and only if
(A4) < WS _ HSI
q-Z G g
The LHS of condition (A4) is the wage elasticity of the excess 
surplus of the marginal over average productivity. The RHS is the 
difference between the wage elasticities of the distribution 
function and of the density function. A high positive wage 
response of the marginal relative to the average productivity 
would make it less likely that Z" (W) might be negative. On the 
other hand, a 'steep' (highly wage elastic) distribution function 
relative to the density, or a negatively sloped density, would 
lead to a negative value of Z"(W).
The assumption Z"(W)<0 made in the text can thus be Justified 
on the grounds that large increases in productivity can only be 
observed over a range of values for wages characterized by a 
decreasing density function.
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Appendix B - Employment elasticity of IT^
By making use of equation (15) in the text for profits, the 
coefficient a^  ^ in (20) can be written as
a = U"(PZF’-W)-(U-0)[PZ"F’+PN(Z’)^"]+U’PZZ’NF''
= U"n^ - (u-0) + U'n^w - u' (nyN)
where
= (PZ'F'-l)N 
= PZF’-W
= PZ"NF' + P(Z' ) V F "  
TT = PZ'F' + PZZ’NF" - 1NW
Hence,
and a >0 iff 
21
e eTT , N TT, N
1 + —   e ,   — c > 0
=U.K “ C*.W
which coincides with condition (22) in the text.
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Appendix C - Contract curve and labour heterogeneity
The equation of the contract curve is given by (19b) in the 
text. Its slope is given by
^  ^ _____________ U'PZ^F"-(U-U)PZZ'F"______________
U"(PZF’-W)-(U-U)[PZ"F’+PN(Z’ )^F"]+U’PZZ’NF"
which is steeper than in the absence of heterogeneity (that is, 
if Z’=0) if the following sufficient condition is met:
ZZ’NF" - [Z"F’+N(Z’)^F"1 < 0
which can be expressed as
''"hw - "w ~ ^ °
After some algebraic manipulations, and remembering that H^<0, 
one obtains condition (23) in the text.
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Appendix D - Union rents maximization and efficiency wages
Let us assume that the union’s utility is as in chapter 1, 
that is
(Dl) U(W,N) = N-[V(W) - V(W)]
The first-order conditions for an efficient bargain are
(D2a) V’(W) <PF[Z(W)N] - WN} +
+ N-[V(W) - V(W)] { PZ’(W)F’[Z(W)N] - 1} = 0
(D2b) [V(W) - V(W)] { PZ’(W)F’[Z(W)N] - 1} +
- V’(W) (PZ(W)F’[Z(W)N] - W} = 0
By totally differentiating (D2a) and (D2b) one obtains
(D3a) <V"(PF-WN) + ZV’(PZ’NF’-W) + N(V-V)(PZ"F’+PZ’^NF")> dW 
+ <V’(PZF’-W) + (V-V)(PZ’F’-1) + N(V-V)(PZZ’F"> dN 
= - {V’F + N(V-V)Z’F’> dP + NV’(PZ’F’-l) dW
( D 3 b )  { U " ( P Z F ’ - W ) - ( U - U ) [ P Z " F ’ + P N ( Z ’ ) ^ F " ] + U ’P Z Z ’N F " }  d W
+  < U ’P Z ^ F " - ( U - U ) P Z Z ’F " }  d N  
=  - ( P Z ’F ’ - 1 ) 0 ’ d W  + [ ( U - U ) Z ’F ’ - U ’Z F ’ ] d P
It  i s  a p p a r e n t  t h a t  t h e  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s  r e s u l t s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  
t o  t h e  p r i c e  l e v e l  P  a r e  u n c h a n g e d  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  e x p e c t e d
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utility function. The properties related to the alternative wage 
W are instead modified as follows.
Case I. —  > 0 —  I 0
dW dW
Case II. —  I 0 —  I 0
dW dW
Case III. —  I 0 —  > 0
dW dW
Case IV.
Sub-case (a) —  < 0 —  > 0
dW dW
Sub-case (b) —  > 0 —  < 0
dW dW
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Appendix E - Utilitarian union and membership
Let us consider the maximization programme (28) subject to 
(25a)-(25d).
(a) Homogeneous labour
HV ~ ~
(El) « PNF"(U')1J - (PF'-W)U"U(U-U) + <[(PF'-W)u"-2NU']PF"U'
dM
- (PF-WN)U"[U'(PF'-W)-(U-U)]} U
Upon making use of the first-order conditions and simplifying, 
one has
(E2) « PF" (PF-WN)U’U" - PNF"(U')2 - (PF’-W)^J’U" > 0
dM
(b) Heterogeneous labour
(E3) A - —  = (1-PZ'F')NU'[-PZZ'F"(U-U)+PZ^F"U'] - (1-PZ'F') 
U dM
(U-U)-{-[EZ'T’+PNCZ’)V" (U-U) + (PZF’-W)U"+PNZZ’F"U'} + A
where Asa a -a a . After substituting out and simplifying,
11 22 12 21 ®  j O.
one obtains
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(E4) A = (PF-WN)PZ^F"U’U" - 4(PZF’-W)PNZZ’F"(U’
+ 2(PZ’F’-1)PNZ^F"(U’ + P ^ V f ’F"U’ [NU+(M-N)U]
+ 2(PZF’-W) [PZ"F’+PN(Z* )V'1U’(U-U) - 2(PZF’- W ) ^ ’U"
By combining (D3) and (D4) and further simplifying, one has
1 rfV p p
A - —  = (PF-WN)PZ F"U'U" - 2(PZF’-W)PNZZ’G"(U’)
0  dM
+ (PZ’F’-I)PNZV’(U’)^  + [NU+(M-N)U]P^^”F’F"U’
+ (PZF’-W)P[Z"F’+N(Z’) V ] U ’(U-U) - PZF'-W)^U'U"
= PZ^Z"F'F"U'[NU+(M-N)U] (a)
+ (1-PZ'F')PZF"NU'[Z'(U-U)-ZU'] (b)
+ Cl-PZ'F')P(U-U){ZZ'NF"U'-(U-U)Z"F'> (c)
+ Cl-PZ'F')(U-U)^PNZ’^F" (d)
+ Cl-PZ'F')U"(U-U)(PZF'-W) Ce)
+ PZ^F"U'U"CPF-WN) Cf)
The expressions Cd), Ce) and Cf) are always positive, Ca) is 
positive since Z"Cw)<0, Cb) is positive iff WZ'/Z<WU'AJ, and Cc) 
is positive iff
W Z "  1 ^ ^
Z' Z  U - U  F'
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Figure 1 - Homogeneous labour: interior solution
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Figure 2 - Heterogeneous labour: Case 11(a)
W
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Figure 3 - Heterogeneous labour: Case 11(b)
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Figure 4 - Heterogeneous labour: Case III
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Figure 5 - Heterogeneous labour: Case IV(a)
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CHAPTER 3
WAGE AND PRICE FLEXIBILITY, INFLATION EXPECTATIONS 
AND VARIABILITY OF OUTPUT
1. Introduction
The previous chapters have addressed the issue of the 
determination of wages and employment at the level of individual 
firms. Empirical observations are seen to be consistent with the 
presence of bargaining between firms and workers. Important 
non-competitive elements are thus present in the labour market.
In the present and the following chapters I explore some 
macroeconomic implications of the existence of microeconomic 
rigidities^. Specifically, I investigate the issue of whether the 
existence of predetermined wages and prices can lead to an 
increased variability of activity and employment levels. The 
channel through which such a destabilization might occur is 
represented by expectations of the future price level. If wages 
and prices are set in advance of the realization of stochastic 
shocks, uncertainty in the economy about future variables is 
reduced. On the other hand, rigid wages and prices may cause 
expectations to react in a destabilizing fashion to such shocks.
*The literature on the relationship between nominal/real 
rigidities and business cycle theory is surveyed and critically 
assessed by Blanchard and Fischer (1989).
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The net outcome could in principle be ambiguous: output and
employment can be either more or less variable as a result of 
increased wage and price flexibility, according as to how exactly 
wages and prices are determined, to the nature of the shocks, and 
to the process by which expectations of future prices are formed.
Some recent literature has looked at this problem from a 
modern perspective (important contributions were put forward by, 
amongst others, DeLong and Summers (1986a, 1986b, 1988), Driskill 
and Sheffrin (1986), Hahn and Solow (1986), and Taylor (1986a); 
for critical assessments one can see Fischer (1988), Blanchard 
and Fischer (1989), Blanchard (1990)). The issue is however not a 
new one: the awareness of its relevance dates back at least since 
the Keynes-Pigou controversy about whether increased price 
flexibility is always capable of restoring a market clearing 
equilibrium, starting from a condition of underemployment^. Pigou 
was able to establish that the real wealth effect on consumption 
following a price deflation must lead to a recovery of employment 
and activity levels.
A different perspective had been taken up by Fisher (1923, 
1925, 1933) who focusses on the disruption to financial markets 
and institutions occurring whilst a deflation is taking place. 
The starting point of Fisher's analysis was the observed positive 
correlation between (a distributed lag of) price changes and an 
indicator of trade volume. The argument for a deflation-based
^See Keynes (1936) and Pigou (1943, 1947).
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theory of business cycles relies on debt liquidation and distress 
selling when borrowers are over-exposed. The resulting fall in 
prices reduces net profits, with the initial fall in output and 
employment being further aggravated by the ensuing pessimism and 
loss of confidence. Mundell (1963) shows that anticipated 
inflation can have real effects in a Meltzer-type framework where 
wealth can be held in the form of either money or shares^.
In the present and the following chapters the relationship 
between wage and price flexibility and output variability is 
analyzed in a framework in which the possible channel for 
destabilization is the expected inflation effect on aggregate 
demand. The emphasis is placed upon labour contracts and 
imperfections in the labour and product markets. Following a 
demand shock, the movement in the aggregate price level acts as 
an automatic stabilizer due to a real balance effect. Current 
expectations of future inflation, however, may play a 
destabilizing role via changes in the ex ante real rate of 
interest if expected inflation moves procyclically. Whether 
expected inflation exacerbates output and employment fluctuations 
depends on the characteristics of the shocks from which the
^Theories of depressions based on similar arguments have been 
proposed again recently by Bernanke (1983), Bernanke and Gertler 
(1989), and Calomiris and Hubbard (1989) amongst others. This 
research programme relates macroeconomic fluctuations to agency 
costs in firms and credit institutions.
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economy is affected, on the mechanism whereby expectations are 
formed, and on the precise nature of the rigidities in the labour 
and product markets.
The net effect of an increase in wage and price flexibility is 
in general ambiguous due to second-best considerations. As a 
consequence of the existence of imperfections in the economy, an 
increased response of wages and prices to labour and product 
market imbalances might in principle have perverse effects. A 
countercyclical demand management policy can be more effective in 
dampening output fluctuations than a policy aimed at reducing 
rigidities in the labour market. The present chapter aims to 
provide a critical assessment of this issue and to furnish a 
selected survey of the related literature. The review is by no 
means exhaustive, its main purpose being to introduce the 
analyses of chapters 4 and 5 and relate them to previous 
contributions.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. The next section 
analyses the dynamic stability of a system with expected 
inflation, under both adaptive and rational expectations. Section 
3 looks at Taylor-type models with staggering of wages and 
prices. In section 4 alternative supply-side specifications are 
proposed and wage flexibility is seen to decrease output 
variability in a model with synchronized wage contracts and 
uncorrelated demand shocks. Section 5 summarizes the results and 
provides a description of the following chapters.
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2. Dynamic stability of equilibrium
The question of whether a market economy might ever be unable
to remedy to a protracted disequilibrium in the goods market has
been elegantly addressed by Tobin (1975) in an explicitly dynamic
framework (see also Tobin (1980)). Effective demand, e, depends
positively on real output, y, negatively on the price level, p
(due to both a Keynes effect on real balances and a Pigou effect
on wealth), and positively on expected inflation, ir^spVp, via
changes in the ex ante real rate of interest*: e=e(y, p, 7t*), where
0<e <1, e <0, e e>0. The supply side of the economy is y p n
characterized by adjustment of output to effective demand 
(equation (1)), by an expectations-augmented Phillips curve 
(equation (2)), and by an adaptive rule of expectations formation 
(equation (3))^:
4
The assumption is made that the expansionary effect of expected 
inflation outweighs the capital losses incurred by holders of 
money balances.
^Tobin contrasts this model (which he defines as the Walras- 
Keynes-Phillips adjustment system) to a Marshallian model, in 
which prices - rather than quantities - respond to an excess of 
demand over output, and where the level of activity reacts to 
deviations from full employment via changes in factor prices. The 
Marshallian system is shown to be always dynamically stable.
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(1) y = a^(e-y)
* .
(2) îi = a (y-y ) + n
p
(3) 7T® = a eCir-îr*)n
Equations (l)-(3) describe a dynamical system in the variables 
(y,p,ir*). Necessary condition for local stability is
»
(4) p e + a e e e < 0 p n u
(-) (+)(+)
#
where p is the equilibrium value of prices. It is easily seen 
that, for a given expectations formation parameter a^e, the 
condition (4) is not satisfied if the stabilizing role of e is
p
small vis-à-vis the "speculative" effect of inflation 
expectations upon aggregate demand as measured by e^e.
An intuitive account for this result can be as follows. When 
output is lower than its full employment level, current prices 
increase by less than expected, thereby stimulating aggregate 
demand through a real balance effect. By contrast, a negative 
inflationary surprise implies a downward revision of current 
expectations of future inflation, due to the adaptive rule of 
expectations formation. This will increase the expected ex ante 
real interest rate and depress aggregate demand. The latter 
effect may well outweigh the former, thus violating condition 
(4).
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The assumption of adaptive expectations is crucial in driving 
the results. It implies that, in the presence of an inflationary 
surprise, expectations are always revised in the same direction 
as the shock. On the other hand, if agents are entirely 
backward-looking, they only gradually adjust their inflation 
expectations to a permanent shock to the level of activity. 
Hence, they will be systematically surprised by the realized 
inflation level in each period.
By contrast to Tobin’s analysis, McCallum (1983b) shows that, 
if rational expectations are introduced, the system is stable 
even in the presence of a "liquidity trap" in money demand - and 
hence without a stabilizing Keynes effect on aggregate demand for 
output - provided a Pigou effect on consumption is in operation. 
The discrete-time specification of the model is very similar to 
Tobin’s continuous-time analytical framework. Aggregate demand is 
given by
where b >0 reflects the Pigou effect and where v is a white
4 t
noise aggregate demand disturbance. The monetary rule consists of 
pegging the nominal interest rate: r^=r. The adjustment equation
for output is
(6) ^ 0<A<1
The model is closed by a Lucas-Sargent-Wallace surprise supply
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function, augmented to allow for adjustment costs to the level of 
activity:
(7) y^-y = \
The minimal state solution, which by construction rules out 
bubbles or explosive paths, can be found by the method of 
undetermined coefficients and has the form
(8) y^-y =
where is the coefficient on lagged output in (7). Thus, the 
dynamic stability of the system directly follows from the 
stability of aggregate supply (7). Hence, McCallum argues that 
there is "no support for Tobin’s suggestion that the system lacks 
self-correcting mechanisms - i.e., is dynamically unstable - in 
the presence of a Pigou effect" (1983b, p. 400). Clearly, the 
assumption of rational expectations is critical to this 
conclusion. Lower than expected current inflation does not imply 
lower current expectations of future inflation. Hence, the 
destabilizing mechanism envisaged by Tobin is no longer at work*.
*In Chapter 4 it is shown that, in a flexible price model similar 
to McCallum*s, inflation expectations increase output variability 
if demand shocks display a sufficiently high degree of serial 
correlation. McCallum*s results seem thus to depend critically
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3. Staggered wages and prices
Several attempts have been recently put forward in order to 
Justify a destabilizing role for wages and price flexibility in a 
rational expectations framework. DeLong and Summers (1986a) 
maintain that the lower output variability in the 
post-World-War-II US economy relative to the pre-War period is 
largely due to a greater degree of predetermination of wages and 
prices. They do not however explicitly control for the 
counter-cyclical stance of monetary and fiscal policy in the more 
recent period^. Moreover, as Taylor (1986a, 1986b) points out,
they do not allow for the fact that the variance of the shocks 
from which the US economy was affected after WW-II is lower than 
before the war.
The DeLong-Summers explanation is also criticized by Driskill 
and Sheffrin (1986), who consider a staggered wage model à-la 
Taylor modified to incorporate an expected inflation effect on 
aggregate demand. Driskill and Sheffrin consider the responses of 
the economy to wage-push shocks of the type considered by Taylor 
(1979, 1980). They conclude that the expected inflation effect is 
always stabilizing in the presence of such supply shocks.
upon assuming white noise aggregate demand disturbances.
^Barro (1989), for instance, argues that there is evidence that 
the FED has engaged in countercyclical monetary policy since 
World War II.
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Positive wage or price surprises are in fact always accompanied 
by a decrease in the ex ante real interest rate. The 
contractionary effects of the shock are thus offset by an 
increase in aggregate demand. The expected inflation effect acts 
as an automatic stabilizer in the face of cost-push shocks.
DeLong and Summers (1986b) however contend that one should be 
concerned with the responses of the level of activity to demand 
disturbances. If one shares the Keynesian tenet that the business 
cycle is largely induced by fluctuations to the level of 
aggregate demand, the critical issue becomes whether expected 
inflation is stabilizing in the presence of such shocks. 
Furthermore, DeLong and Summers argue that, for the effects of 
the demand disturbances to persist over the cycle, it is 
necessary to assume that the shocks are serially correlated. The 
model which they consider has the following structure:
(9) = -a \
(11) m^ = p^ + y^ - vi^
(12) m^ = (3i^
(13) i + 5
(14) p^ = i
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Equations (9)-(12) characterize the demand side, whereas 
equations (13)-(14) describe the supply side of the economy. The 
IS schedule is given by (9), with stationary AR(1) demand shocks 
as in (10). Equation (11) is the LM curve, with velocity being a 
positive function of the nominal interest rate. The monetary 
authorities follow the policy rule (12), thereby making money 
supply an endogenous variable. Equation (13) is a standard 
Taylor-type wage setting rule, with equal weights being put on 
the backward- and the forward-looking components. Prices are 
finally given in (14) under uniform staggering as a constant 
mark-up on wages.
Aggregate demand is obtained by combining (9)-(12):
(15) y^ = k-{a[ (E^p^^^-p^)-0+v)“ p^^ ]+Tî^ >
Prices exert a role on aggregate demand through both a level and 
an expected inflation effect. The former is always stabilizing, 
whereas the latter could be destabilizing. No clear-cut 
analytical results are available. However, DeLong and Summers' 
numerical simulations show that, as g increases, the steady state 
variance of output typically increases, provided demand shocks 
are not close to following a random walk. Similar results are 
obtained if the contract length increases for a given period 
unit, or alternatively if the period unit is shortened. From 
this, DeLong and Summers infer that increases in wage and price 
flexibility would be destabilizing, for empirically plausible 
parameter values.
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Some remarks are in order on these results. First, it should 
be noticed that DeLong and Summers interpret destabilization of 
the activity level in the sense of an increase in the asymptotic 
variance of output, and not as dynamic instability of the system. 
Second, by admission of the authors, a steep AD (i.e., a flat LM 
and/or a steep IS) is required in order to generate the 
destabilizing outcome. Third, the parameter measuring the 
response of wages to excess demand conditions, g, is only allowed 
to vary in the interval [0,1]. This implies that the AS schedule 
is constrained to be relatively flat on the output-price plane. 
With a steep AS, increased wage flexibility might again be 
stabilizing.
The analytical set-up of DeLong and Summers has been 
criticized by King (1988) on the grounds that it does not allow 
for any contemporaneous response of wages and prices to demand 
shocks. If a fraction of wages is set in a spot market, and is 
thus able to immediately react to current shocks, then the 
asymptotic variance of output is always a decreasing function of 
g, provided the proportion of wages determined in the spot sector 
is not too small. In their reply, DeLong and Summers (1988) argue 
that King's results are crucially driven by his assumption that 
wages are a jump variable. This assumption is not realistic, in 
their opinion: in a contracting framework, nominal wages should
properly be modelled as being predetermined. If numerical 
simulations are carried out with predetermined wages in the spot 
sector then again wage flexibility is destabilizing.
In a recent paper. Ambler and Phaneuf (1989) look at a further
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modification to Taylor's model. Wage setters are assumed to be 
endowed with the same information set as the investors. They are 
therefore able to observe the current value of shocks before 
wages are determined. With positively correlated demand shocks, 
the steady-state variance of output often decreases as the 
flexibility of wages increases. Price flexibility is stabilizing 
the more, the greater is the weight being placed upon the 
forward-looking component in wage setting. However, a criticism 
similar to the one addressed to King’s (1988) procedure can be 
applied to this case as well. Nominal wages effectively behave as 
a Jump variable, and this assumption is questionable in a 
contracting set-up. If individual wage setting is staggered over 
time and the realization of current demand shocks is not known at 
the time when wages are set, then increased flexibility may well 
exacerbate output fluctuations.
4. Some alternative supplv-side specifications
In the previous section it was shown that, when wages are 
staggered over time in a Taylor-type fashion, aggregate demand 
depends on expected inflation and demand shocks are 
autocorrelated, then increased flexibility may be destabilizing 
in the sense of involving a larger asymptotic variance of output. 
It could be argued that this outcome crucially depends on 
specific features of Taylor’s model. In the present section I 
look at alternative ways to characterize the supply side of the 
economy. I start with Hahn and Solow’s (1986) overlapping
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generations model, and then I furnish some comments on Flemming* s 
(1987) analysis which assumes a gradual adjustment of wages 
towards their equilibrium level. Finally, an example with 
rational expectations is presented in which increased price 
flexibility has the effect of reducing the asymptotic 
(steady-state) variance of output. The expected inflation effect 
on aggregate demand is seen to unambiguously decrease output 
variability, provided the system is stable. However, this result 
relies on assuming white noise demand shocks. Furthermore, the 
presence of the expected inflation effect makes it less likely 
that the condition for dynamic stability is satisfied.
Hahn and Solow (1986) make use of an OLG model to contrast an 
economy with wage flexibility to another with a fixed wage but in 
which an active monetary policy is pursued. Agents are assumed to 
live for three periods. They invest when they are young, produce 
when they are middle-aged, and consume when they are old. By 
considering a three-period overlapping generations framework, 
Hahn and Solow are able to include capital as a state variable in 
a monetary economy. Production, investment and prices evolve 
according to a non-linear third-order difference equation, which, 
as expected, turns out to be very sensitive to the arbitrary 
initial conditions. Few analytical results are therefore 
available. It seems however that active monetary policy dominates 
increased wage flexibility as far as the stability properties of 
the system are concerned. This conclusion is perfectly consistent 
with the results reported in the chapter 5, where it is shown 
that active policy can be effective in reducing the negative
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externalities from decentralized price setting in a 
monopolistically competitive set-up.
Flemming (1987) looks at the stability properties of the 
equilibrium of an economy in which wages are sluggish and only 
gradually adjust to their equilibrium values, whereas prices 
instantaneously clear the goods market given the nominal wage. In 
this fashion, real wages effectively behave as a Jump variable. 
Demand disturbances follow a random walk, and agents' 
expectations are rationally formed. For a certain range of
parameter values, increases in the response of wages to the wage
gap might be destabilizing. This is attributed to the fact that 
"greater wage flexibility implies a reduced responsiveness of 
prices to wages and thus greater sensitivity of both real wages 
and employment to disturbances" (Flemming (1987), p. 162). These 
results are consistent with our findings of chapter 4, where a 
variant of Fischer’s overlapping wage contracts model is
analyzed. In Flemming's original article, however, it does not 
seem to be fully appreciated that the destabilizing outcome 
critically depends on assuming random walk aggregate demand 
shocks. As shown in chapter 4, it is the presence of highly 
correlated demand disturbances that makes expected inflation move 
procyclically, and this widens output fluctuations.
The final model considered in the present section has been 
proposed by McCallum (1983b). It is a variant of the
specification already discussed in section 2. In modelling the 
supply side of the economy, use is made of a discrete-time
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version of Mussa’s (1981) continuous-time price adjustment rule®. 
Here, demand shocks are assumed to follow a white noise pattern. 
Positive costs of changing prices, and uniform staggering of 
individual price setting decisions, lead to an equation for the 
aggregate price level characterized by gradual adjustment to the 
equilibrium (market-clearing) level. McCallum looks at the 
dynamic stability properties of the model to infer that, even 
under sluggishness of prices, rational expectations imply that 
the system does not exhibit asymptotic instability. In the 
present section, I analyze the specific relationship between 
price flexibility, inflation expectations, and variability of 
output. It is shown that an increased response of prices to 
excess output demand decreases the asymptotic variability of the 
activity level, provided the model is stable. Also, the expected 
inflation effect is always seen to dampen output variability. 
However, the dynamic stability requirements are less likely to be 
met in the presence of the expected inflation effect and of a 
high degree of price flexibility.
Aggregate prices obey the following rule:
®A rationale for the postulated price rule can be found in 
McCallum (1980). A forthright criticism of McCallum's formulation 
has been expressed by Buiter (1980).
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*
where is the market-clearing price level. Equation (16) is
very similar to an expectations-augmented Phillips curve. The 
only difference lies in the fact that the expectations term does 
not refer to actual inflation, but to changes in the equilibrium
value of the price level. One can combine (5) and (6) from
Section 2 to obtain
where u^ is serially uncorrelated. Use has been made of the 
assumption that the LM schedule is horizontal, and that therefore 
one can set m^=m. Due to the liquidity trap, no stabilizing 
Keynes effect is present in equation (17), so that one is left 
with the expected inflation effect operating in isolation. After 
setting the reduced form for the deviations of output
from its natural level is
(18)
where
yA(b +b )
(19) - ...i:Abi
It is easily seen that <f><l is always satisfied, while it cannot 
be ruled out on a priori grounds that #<-1. McCallum however 
argues that this inequality is unlikely to be met, for plausible 
values of the parameters. The system is then stationary, and the
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asymptotic variance of the deviations of output from its market 
clearing level is given by
where . One can show that
d'y 1-Xb c
ôb^ 1-Xb e
since 0<Xb^<l. Hence, increases in the wage flexibility parameter 
y, or in the coefficient of expected inflation b^ , have the 
effect of reducing the asymptotic variability of output around 
its equilibrium level. On the other hand, it is apparent from
(19) that an increase in wage flexibility or in the coefficient 
pertaining to expected inflation would make it less likely that 
the stationarity condition <f>>-l be met. The system could thus 
exhibit dynamic instability.
It should be noticed that the aggregate price equation (16) is 
very close in spirit to a Lucas-Sargent-Wallace specification of
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a "surprise" aggregate supply function*. As shown in the next 
chapter, the reduction of output variability critically hinges 
upon assuming uncorrelated demand shocks. In this case, expected 
inflation moves countercyclically and dampens output 
fluctuations. If demand shocks were to be highly serially 
correlated, a destabilizing outcome would ensue.
5. Conclusions and outline of the next chapters
The present chapter has assessed some recent literature on the 
relationship between wage/price flexibility and output 
variability, in the presence of an expected inflation effect on 
aggregate demand. The process of expectations formation is 
clearly crucial. Under an adaptive rule expected inflation moves 
in a procyclical fashion, thus exacerbating the effects of 
shocks. Under rational expectations, one should consider both the 
exact form of wage/price stickiness and the degree of 
autocorrelation of the demand shocks in order to determine the 
possible destabilizing effect of increased wage and price 
flexibility.
This chapter has looked at models with wage staggering à-la 
Taylor or ad hoc price adjustment rules. Chapter 4 investigates 
the possibility of destabilizing inflation expectations in a 
variant of Fischer's (1977) overlapping wage contract model, and
*See Buiter (1980)
- 136 -
derives analytical conditions for output destabilization to 
occur. It also shows that price stickiness is neither a necessary 
nor a sufficient condition for destabilization. By making use of 
a Sargent-Wallace surprise supply function and of a Lucas 
equilibrium model with signal extraction, it demonstrates that 
the crucial condition is the degree of serial correlation of the 
demand shocks. Destabilization of output is thus perfectly 
consistent with price flexibility of a new classical variety.
Chapter 5 looks at a monopolistic competition model with 
synchronized wage contracts. Under decentralized price setting, 
individual firms do not internalize the effects that their price 
decision exerts upon the aggregate price level. It is shown that, 
in such a monopolistically competitive framework, the 
consideration of the expected inflation effect always makes it 
more likely that increases in wage and price flexibility reduce 
employment variability. This result is driven by the presence of 
externalities in the price setting process. It is also shown that 
wage and price flexibility, although ceteris paribus desirable, 
is an inferior substitute for optimally designed demand 
management.
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CHAPTER 4
EXPECTED INFLATION AND OUTPUT VARIABILITY IN CONTRACTING 
AND FLEXIBLE PRICE MODELS
1. Introduction
Increased wage flexibility is not necessarily stabilizing even 
when private agents form expectations rationally. This 
influential proposition, initially put forward by DeLong and 
Summers (1986b), seems to have survived several criticisms. 
Whether a destabilizing outcome is more likely to occur is 
however still an unsettled issue. Ambiguity arises since there 
are no clear-cut analytical results when Taylor’s model is 
augmented to consider explicitly the effect of expected inflation 
on aggregate demand and persistence in demand shocks^.
The literature has focussed on this particular class of 
contracting models ignoring, to our knowledge, the wage structure 
presented in the seminal paper by Fischer (1977) as well as
^The expected inflation effect is the channel through which 
destabilizing increased wage flexibility may occur (DeLong and 
Summers(1986b)). Persistence in aggregate demand disturbances is 
also necessary. A white noise demand shock would not, in fact, 
alter the analytical stabilizing results obtained by Driskill and 
Sheffrin (1986) in a model containing only wage push shocks.
- 138 -
rational expectations models with flexible prices. Of course, in 
the latter case the only relevant issue is whether or not the 
expected inflation (or Keynes-Tobin-Mundell) effect, presented in 
the previous chapter, dampens output variability.
Probably, such a lack of attention to new classical models can
be explained on the grounds that inflationary expectations were
2
generally regarded as playing a stabilizing role .
The aim of the present chapter is twofold. We first 
investigate the effects of increased wage flexibility on the 
variability of real output in a variant of Fischer's overlapping 
wage contract model. The original framework is duly modified to 
incorporate both the necessary requirements for a potential 
destabilizing effect, namely expected inflation and 
autoregressive aggregate demand shocks. Our theoretical findings 
provide analytical support to some of the propositions presented 
by DeLong and Summers.
Secondly, we analyze the stabilizing properties of the 
expected inflation effect in two standard new classical models, 
where output supply is respectively of the Sargent and Wallace 
(1975) and Lucas (1973) variety. We are able to demonstrate that 
price stickiness is not a critical requirement for destabilizing 
inflation expectations. In other words, the source of instability 
emphasized by Keynes (1936, chap. 19), Fisher (1933) and Tobin
^See e.g. DeLong and Summers (1988).
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(1975) in models with market imperfections and static or adaptive 
expectations carries through to models with both rational 
expectations and flexible prices.
The scheme of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 presents 
our variant of Fischer's model. The main analytical findings are 
discussed in section 3. Section 4 examines the effects of 
inflation expectations in a standard new classical model. The 
concluding section 5 summarizes the results.
2. Output variabilitv in an overlapping wage contract model
The theoretical set-up we consider is a variant of Fischer’s 
(1977) overlapping contracts model. Nominal wages are 
predetermined for either one or two periods with the aim of 
maintaining ex ante constancy of the real wage each period. 
Output is a negative function of real wages. Aggregate demand 
depends positively on real balances and on expected inflation via 
the real ex ante interest rate. For simplicity, a serially 
correlated real demand shock is the only source of uncertainty 
considered.
The model has the following structure (all variables are in 
logs):
(1) y = ak(p -E p ) + (l-a)k(p -E p ) 0<a<l
t t-1 t t t-2 t
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(3) c = pc + u 0<p<l
t ^ t-i t
where is real output, p^ output price, m nominal money
balances, c a real demand shock, and E denotes mathematical
t t-s
expectation conditional on the information set available in 
period t-s.
Equation (1) is aggregate supply. The coefficient a describes 
the proportion of one-period contracts in the economy, and is our 
suggested measure of wage and price flexibility. This choice can 
be justified by assuming the existence of different costs of 
adjustment across firms in the economy. The absolute value of the 
real wage elasticity of output supply is given by the parameter 
k. Equation (2) is aggregate demand. The coefficient y>0 is the 
reciprocal of the income elasticity of the demand for real
balances. Since we abstract from the role of monetary policy and 
from nominal shocks, money balances are held constant. The
coefficient (3 measures the semi-elasticity of aggregate demand
with respect to the expected inflation rate. It is positive since
the expansionary effects of expected inflation are assumed to 
outweigh the capital losses incurred by holders of money 
balances. Equation (3) describes the stationary AR(1) process
followed by the real aggregate demand shock.
By equating (1) and (2) one has
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(4) (k+p+y)p = okE p + (l-a)kE p + ^E p + ym + e
t  t — 1 t  W — V t  V + 1  V
A minimal state solution can be postulated as (see e.g. McCallum 
(1983a)):
(5) p = 7tm + iie +7TU +iru
0 1 t-2 2 t-i 3 t
Using (5) to evaluate conditional expectations, substituting into
(4) and equating coefficients with (5) one obtains the following 
reduced form solution for the equilibrium price level:
(P+y)p
(6) p^ m + p(i_p)+y [k(l-a)+3+y] 0(l-p)+y] \-i
k(l-a) [j3(l-p)+y] + 0+y)^ 
(k+p+y)[k(l-a)+p+y][p(l-p)+y]
Upon substitution of (6) into the aggregate supply (1) one 
obtains the solution for the level of output:
(7) y = $u + \Pu
t t-i t
where
- 142 -
k(l-a) 0+3r)p 
^ " [k(l-*)+p+y][e(l-p)+y]
(7b) Ÿ =
k^(l-a)[p(l-p)+y]+kO+y)^ 
[k(l-a)+|5+y] (k+p+y) [p(l-p)+y]
The asymptotic variance of output is given by
where <r^ is the variance of the innovation component of theu
aggregate demand shock. 
From (7a) and (7b),
2k^(l-a)(p+y)V 
(9a)---- -—  = --------------     < 0
[k(l-a)+p+y]3[p(l-p)+y]2
{k^(l-a)[p(l-p)+y]+k(p+y)^>0+y)Pp
(9b) —  = 2  :------- :---------- —  > 0
[k(l-a)+p+y)3(k+p+y)2[p(l-p)+y]=
It can immediately be seen that both (9a) and (9b) would vanish 
if p were to be equal to zero. Hence, the asymptotic variance of 
output would be invariant to changes in the degree of wage
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flexibility.
The effect of increases in a, for p>0, can be shown to be
d<r^
(10) = e'<k(l-a)p[p(l-p)+y] + (p+y)^p-k(k+p+y)^(l-a)(p+y)^p} <r^
where
e s
(k+p+y)^[k(l-a)+p+y]^[p(l-p)+y]^
The sign of the RHS of (10) critically depends upon parameter 
values. In particular, it is positive if demand shocks exhibit a 
low degree of serial correlation or if contracts in the economy 
are mostly short-term.
3. Interpretation of the results
Out of the several analytical considerations that can be made, 
we elect to stress the following.
From equation (10), it immediately emerges that when the 
expected inflation effect is absent (that is, p=0) increases in 
wage flexibility are always stabilizing, confirming thus the 
intuition of DeLong and Summers (1986b).
There is, however, no analogous counterpart to the stabilizing 
outcome in Taylor-type models in presence of white noise
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aggregate demand shock. From equations (9a) and (9b) one can see 
that, when p is set to zero, the degree of wage flexibility is 
totally irrelevant.
In the general case of autoregressive demand shock (p>0) and 
presence of the expected inflation effect O>0) increases in wage 
flexibility may reduce or exacerbate output fluctuations, 
depending on parameter values. In particular, for low values of p 
increased flexibility is destabilizing and conversely, exactly 
confirming the prediction of DeLong and Summers.
4. The expected inflation effect in standard new classical 
models
There seems to be consensus in the literature towards the view 
that there is no room for destabilizing inflation expectations in 
new classical models (see e.g. McCallum (1983b), DeLong and 
Summers (1988)). Formal analysis of the expected inflation effect 
has typically been carried out in disequilibrium frameworks in 
which price adjustment is not immediate. However, price 
stickiness is not a necessary requirement for destabilizing 
inflation, even when expectations are rational. Destabilization 
of output may indeed occur even with flexible prices.
In the present section we consider two prototypical 
equilibrium models, as set forth by Sargent and Wallace (1975) 
and Lucas (1973) respectively. In the first case, output supply
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is of the standard form
The demand side of the economy is modelled as in section 2 
(equations (2) and (3)). The semi-reduced form solution for the 
price level is obtained by combining (2), (3) and (11):
(12) (k+p+y)p^ =
The guess solution takes the form
(13) p = 7rm + n e  + n u0 1 t - i  2 t
Using (13) to evaluate expectations, substituting into (12) and 
equating coefficients with (13) we obtain the final reduced form 
solution for the price level:
P P+y
(14) p^ - m + p(i_p)+y ^ [p(l-p)+y] (k+p+r)
Output is therefore given by
(15) y^ = S*u^
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where
kO+r)
[p(l-p)+y](k+p+y)
One can see that whether or not the expected inflation effect is 
destabilizing crucially depends upon the degree of serial 
correlation of the aggregate demand shock.
From (15) one can derive
as 2
(16) —  = A'(karp-0+r) (i-p)>
where
(k+e+f)[p(i-p)+?]2
It is immediately apparent that (16) is positive for values of p 
close to unity and negative for p close to zero. Hence, the 
expected inflation effect is destabilizing when aggregate demand 
disturbances exhibit a high degree of serial correlation.
Price stickiness is thus neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for destabilizing inflation expectations. The intuition 
for our result is best explained for the cases of white noise 
(p=0) and random walk (p=l) demand shocks. Expected inflation can
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be expressed respectively as
(16a) (p=0)
When demand disturbances are serially uncorrelated (equation 
(16a)) the innovation in the shock is purely transitory, so that 
expectations of future prices are not affected. Expected 
inflation moves countercyclically and acts as an automatic 
stabilizer^.
When the shock is permanent (equation (16b)) the expectation 
of the next period price level fully reflects the current shock. 
By contrast,the response of the present price level is dampened 
by the contemporaneous increase in output supply. Hence expected 
inflation will move procyclically.
We now investigate the robustness of our result in the 
"island" equilibrium model presented by Lucas (1973), modified to 
incorporate the expected inflation effect. The supply and demand 
schedules in each market are assumed to be as follows:
^The stabilizing results obtained by McCallum (1983b) and 
presented in chapter 4 are due to the white noise nature of the 
demand disturbances.
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(17) y^(z) = k [p^(z) - E^P^l
(18) y (z) = y [m (z)-E p ] + p [E p -E p ] + v (z) + c
V t % V Z tvl Z V t V
where z is a market index and E denotes the mathematical
z
expectation conditional on the available information set, 
containing the model, all the past history of the economy and the 
observation of the current local equilibrium price. Nominal money 
is assumed constant, say m^(z)=m, and the idiosyncratic demand 
shock r^(z) is assumed to be white noise. The economy-wide demand 
shock is, as usual, assumed to follow the stationary
autoregressive process described in (3).
The semi-reduced form for p^(z) is
(19) P, (z) = k"^ [ym + (k-p-y)E p + pE p + v (z) + e ] 
t z t z t+1 t t
The proposed guess solution is
(20) p ( z ) = 7 r m  + ïie + n u + n v (z)
0 1 t-i 2 t 3 t
Using (20),
(21) E p  = iim + ire + ïtE u
z ^ t  0 1 t-i 2 z t
and
- 149 -
(22) E p  =îrm + îrEc 
z t+1 0 1 z t
The signal extraction problem is solved, using (19), as
(23) E u  = 8 [w (z) + u ]
z t t t
where
(24) 0 = “
2 2
cr + 0*
V u
The solutions for the undetermined coefficients are easily seen 
to be
(25a) 71 = 1
0
P
(25b) 71 =------
P ( l - p ) + y
p8p+p(l-p)+y
(25c) =
[k(l-0) + O + 9r)0] [p(l-p)+y]
(25d) 7T^ = k’  ^ [1 + p0%^ + (k-p-3r)07r^ ]
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Averaging (17), (20) and (21) across markets, the economy wide 
equilibrium output can be written as
N N
(26) = N = k (p^ “ z E^P^) = k (l-e)ir^u^
Z=1 2=1
where p^ s p^(z) and N is the total number of markets.
Hence, the expected inflation effect is destabilizing iff 
ôn^/ô/3>0. From (25c), the necessary and sufficient condition for 
this to happen when p=l is
(27) k > r
This result can be explained along lines analogous to the 
Sargent-Wallace model previously analyzed. From (21), (22) and
(25a)-(25c), expected inflation for the cases of white noise and 
random walk demand disturbances is respectively given by
(28) E p - E p = ---------------  (p=0)
 ^ ' k(l-0) + O+r)e
(1-0)(k-y)
(29) E p - E p = ----------------  (p=l)
' ' y[k(l-0)+(p+y)0]
Expected inflation is always an automatic stabilizer if p=0.
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whereas when p=l it moves procyclically, and is thus 
destabilizing, if and only if k>y. This clearly coincides with 
the condition for dn^/d^>0. If the price elasticity of aggregate 
supply is large vis-à-vis the real balance effect, then there 
will be a relatively small response of current prices to the 
demand innovation. On the other hand, future prices fully respond 
to current shocks, given their random walk dynamics.
The source of instability associated to the expected inflation 
effect, dating back to the work of Keynes, Fisher and Tobin and 
recently recast by DeLong and Summers in a staggered wage setting 
framework, generalizes to a larger variety of macroeconomic 
models. The standard new classical approach by no means 
constitutes an exception.
5. Conclusions
Increases in wage flexibility may exacerbate the variability 
of real output in presence of persistent aggregate demand shocks, 
when the expected inflation effect is explicitly modelled. Our 
findings, derived in a variant of Fischer's overlapping wage 
contract set-up, lend analytical support to this proposition, 
originally advocated by DeLong and Summers (1986b) in a Taylor- 
type framework.
The destabilizing influence of inflation expectations has also 
been proved in a standard new classical model. The latter finding
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demonstrates that the source of instability described by Keynes, 
Fisher and Tobin can also be present when prices are flexible and 
expectations are rationally formed.
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CHAPTER 5
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION, EXPECTED INFLATION AND CONTRACT LENGTH
1. Introduction
In chapters 3 and 4 the issue of the possible destabilizing 
effect of increased wage and price flexibility in presence of the 
Keynes-Munde11-Tobin effect has been addressed in models with 
imperfections in the labour market. Nominal wages were 
predetermined, and labour markets were prevented from clearing. 
Imperfections in product markets, however, were not explicitly 
modelled.
An important area of research in modern macroeconomics has 
been directed at providing rigorous microeconomic underpinnings 
for the rigidity of wages and prices. Substantial progress 
towards explaining economic fluctuations has been achieved by 
developing models based on monopolistic competition and 
near-rational behaviour (see, for example, Akerlof and Yellen 
(1985), Ball (1987), Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), and the 
reviews by McCallum (1986), Fischer (1988), and Blanchard 
(1990)). Price and wage rigidity can be compatible with 
optimizing behaviour of individual agents, although undesirable 
fluctuations inevitably emerge in the aggregate.
The present chapter explores the issue of the (de)stabilizing 
effects of increased price flexibility in a variant of a model 
first presented by Ball (1987). This model is particularly 
interesting, since it is explicitly based on monopolistic
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competition and therefore offers a satisfactory framework for the 
analysis of the externalities associated with the existence of 
contracts. Furthermore, Ball's (1987) claim that wages are too 
rigid can be interpreted as basically replicating the results 
emerging from the original Taylor’s (1979) model, that is 
increased wage flexibility, now in the form of reduced contract 
length, would be stabilizing. It is of interest, therefore, to 
verify whether explicitly modelling anticipated inflation could 
produce possible destabilizing effects along the lines described 
by DeLong and Summers (1986b). Our analytical results show that 
the expected inflation effect unambiguously strengthens the case 
for reducing contract length, irrespective of the nature and 
degree of persistence of demand and supply shocks. It is formally 
demonstrated that the negative externalities associated with long 
contracts actually increase. It is also shown that leaning 
against the wind policies can be extremely powerful if and only 
if the expected inflation effect is present.
The main reason for these results lies in the monopolistically 
competitive features of the product market. Under longer 
contracting regimes, inflation expectations are more volatile. If 
firms face a downward sloping demand for output, their level of 
employment directly depends on inflation expectations. The 
presence of this factor in the labour demand schedule is bound to 
increase the variability of employment and output.
The scheme of the chapter is as follows. Section 2 presents a 
version of Ball’s (1987) model modified to explicitly incorporate 
the expected inflation effect and demonstrates that increased
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wage flexibility is likely to be stabilizing. Section 3 considers 
the case of autoregressive demand shocks and relates the results 
to earlier findings in the literature. Section 4 illustrates how 
lagged feedback monetary rules can be effective only in presence 
of the expected inflation effect and compares their relative 
desirability versus increasing wage flexibility. A summary of the 
main results is provided in the concluding section 5.
2. Expected inflation and wage flexibilitv
We now provide an appraisal of the expected inflation effect 
upon aggregate demand, in a rational expectations model with 
predetermined labour contracts^. The specific framework chosen is 
a variant of the discrete time version of Ball's (1987) model of 
long-term contracts under monopolistic competition, modified to 
incorporate inflation expectations. The aim of the analysis is to 
evaluate the implications for employment variability of a shift 
in the economy from short to longer term contracts.
In a standard monopolistically competitive environment, an 
individual firm’s labour demand depends on the firm’s real wage 
and on aggregate demand (see e.g. Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987)).
^This set-up can be justified on the grounds that transaction 
costs prevent agents from signing contracts which are contingent 
upon the realization of current economic variables (as e.g. in 
Fischer (1977)).
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An increase in the average contract length in the economy makes 
nominal wages and prices less responsive to aggregate demand 
shocks: this dampens the variability of the real wage over the 
cycle, but exacerbates the variability of aggregate demand. The 
net effect of longer contracts on the variance of the demand for 
labour and hence of output will therefore depend on the relative 
weight of real wages and demand for goods in the firm's labour 
demand. Any individual firm decides on the length of the contract 
with its workers, neglecting the consequences that its decision 
will have on the aggregate wage and price levels. In so doing, it 
creates externalities upon the other firms. Ball (1987) shows 
that shorter contracts than the market equilibrium ones would be 
socially optimal if and only if an increase in contract length 
creates negative externalities to the single firms, in the sense 
of increasing the variability of the responses of employment and 
output to nominal shocks^.
We now show that a negative dependence of aggregate demand on 
the ex ante real interest rate makes it more likely, in the 
present context, that increases in contract length generate 
negative externalities compared to a situation in which this
^Following the literature (see e.g. Barro (1977)), the ad hoc 
policy criterion chosen is minimizing the fluctuations of actual 
employment about its market clearing level. A rigorous analysis 
of welfare in this kind of models is rather difficult, as shown 
by Ball and Romer (1987).
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effect is absent; in other words, increased wage and price 
flexibility is more likely to be desirable^. The intuition behind 
this result is fairly simple: under a long-term contract regime 
the current price level does not respond to current innovations 
which are instead always incorporated in the current expectations 
of the next period price level. Hence, the presence of expected 
inflation in the labour demand increases the volatility of 
employment and output over the cycle as labour contracts become 
longer.
The structure of the model is as follows. The technology of 
the economy is represented by the following constant returns to 
scale production function
'!> y.t =
where "i" is a firm specific index, uniformly distributed over 
[0,1], and where y^^ and are the logarithms of output and
^Ball (1987) compares the length of the contracts chosen by firms 
in a decentralized economy {Nash equilibrium) in the presence of 
fixed (exogenously given) contracting costs to the Pareto-optimal 
contract length. In equilibrium, firms equate the marginal gains 
from a shorter length to the marginal increase in contracting 
costs. The presence of negative externalities implies that 
shorter contracts would bring about net welfare gains and 
therefore would be socially desirable.
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labour input respectively. The logarithm of money supply follows 
the random walk process
(2)
where is a white noise with variance <r|. The disturbance is 
an exogenous nominal shock, not controllable by the monetary
4
authorities. Aggregate demand is given by
(3)
where y^ and p^ are aggregate output and price level, respectively:
and where ti is a white noise with variance or^ . The symbol E x
t TI t t+s
denotes the expectation of the variable x conditional on the
t+s
information set at time t, which contains the structure of the 
model and all past and current values of the relevant variables: 
in particular, agents can directly observe the two different 
demand shocks and tî^ . The real aggregate demand shock, 7?^ , is 
assumed to be serially uncorrelated; this assumption will be 
relaxed in the next Section, where the results will be compared
^Equation (3) can be seen as the reduced form of a standard IS-LM 
model (see e.g. DeLong and Summers (1986b) and Blanchard (1987)).
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with other findings in the literature. In (3), the coefficient 
(3>0 represents the negative effect on aggregate demand of 
expectations of decreasing inflation.
The firms operate under conditions of monopolistic 
competition. The share of firm "i" ’s demand is
where y>l. Substituting (3) into (4) we obtain
Using (1) and (5), the profit maximizing demand for labour of 
firm "i" is^
where w^^ is the nominal wage. The size of the labour pool of
firm "i" is assumed to be wage inelastic and is normalized to
zero for analytical convenience. The market clearing level of
*
employment is thus The losses from the discrepancy between
actual labour demand and its market clearing level are given by 
the following quadratic function:
^See Appendix A.
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=
We can now examine the behaviour of wages, prices and 
employment under different contracting regimes. Formally, we 
consider contracts spanning either one or two periods and analyze 
how the loss function and the value of the externalities are 
affected in each case when j3>0, that is when the expected 
inflation effect upon aggregate demand is present, compared to a 
situation in which such an effect is absent, that is p=0. Using
(1), (5) and (6) and aggregating, one obtains
(8)
where w^ is the aggregate nominal wage.
When all firms sign contracts which last one period only, they
are virtually executing spot contracts and can therefore fix
*
employment at the market clearing level: which
obviously implies z^^=0. From (6) and ^^^=0 we have
a
(9) w = - m +
It r t 1-
(3 1
p + — E p + — n 
r t^ t+i y 't
Aggregating and using (8) one obtains
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a P
V i * i  * ^  \
Equation (10) can be solved by the method of undetermined 
coefficients (see e.g. McCallum (1983a)) to obtain*
Consider now the case in which all firms predetermine wages for 
two periods. There is no staggering: all contracts are perfectly 
synchronized. In the first period, wages are set at the market 
clearing level and thus equations (9) and (11) still hold true. 
In the second period wages are set at the level for which 
 ^(^^ ^)=0. Taking conditional expectations of the labour demand 
(6) and rearranging we obtain
f a+Pl 
1--- E p + — E p + — E TÎ 
y r t-i't
After aggregating and using (8) the solution for the price level 
turns out to be
(13)
*Details of this and later proofs can be found in Appendix A.
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We can now address the Issue of the value of the externalities 
in each regime. Since each firm has zero measure, the 
externalities are defined as 'the effects on firm "i" of a change 
in the contract length of other firms’ (Ball (1987), p. 619). If 
the net externalities from an increase in contract length are 
negative, then it would be optimal for a social planner to 
reduce, if possible, the length of the contracts, thereby 
increasing the degree of flexibility of wages and prices. We show 
that the presence of the expected inflation effect makes it 
indeed more likely that negative externalities might arise.
Let all firms, with the exception of firm "i", move from one 
to two-period labour contracts. If firm "i" is in a one-period 
contract, or in the first period of a two-period contract, then 
the condition ^^^=0 implies that there cannot be any 
externalities from the behaviour of other firms, since any 
increase in their contract length will be exactly offset by firm 
"i". Hence, externalities can only occur in the second period of 
a two-period contract.
Suppose now that all other firms are in a one-period contract, 
and firm "i" is in the second period of a two-period contract. 
Equation (11) for the aggregate price level still holds true, 
since firm "i" 's behaviour cannot affect aggregate magnitudes. 
Together with the wage setting equation (12), this implies
(14)
By substitution of (2), (11) and (14) into the labour demand
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equation (6), we obtain
(15) = ? St + \
whence, using (7) :
" "  <
The loss function is a decreasing function of the parameter
P: the variability of employment and output is lower the more
responsive aggregate demand is to changes in expected inflation.
The intuition of this result is straightforward. All other 
firms observe the current realizations of the stochastic shocks 
and can thus replicate the competitive solution. Wages and prices 
fully reflect changed demand conditions. The only externality for 
firm "i" is due to the variability of its real wage. Since its 
nominal wage is predetermined, the welfare loss is monotonically 
related to the variance of the aggregate, non-predetermined, 
price level. Following exogenous demand shocks, the price level 
will change less since expected inflation varies anticyclically 
and exerts thus a built-in stabilizing effect on aggregate 
demand.
Let us now assume that all other firms are in a two-period 
contract. Equations (12) and (13) imply
(17)
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By substitution into (6), we obtain
(18) = (*+p) + Tî^
and therefore
(19) = (a+3)^<Tç + <r^
The loss is now an increasing function of the expected
inflation effect (as measured by p). In this case externalities 
arise only from variability in real aggregate demand, since the 
price level is predetermined. Expected inflation now varies 
procyclically (following demand shocks) and thus amplifies the 
destabilizing effects of the exogenous disturbances. The expected 
inflation effect acts now as an automatic destabilizer.
It follows from (16) and (19) that the necessary and 
sufficient condition for negative externalities from an increase 
in contract length (i.e., the condition for zj^<zj^^) is
(20) y < * + p
Condition (20) has an immediate interpretation in terms of the 
parameters of equations (3) and (4). Long-term contracts have a 
negative net externality if the real wage elasticity of the 
demand for labour, y, is lower than the sum of the elasticities 
of aggregate demand with respect to real money balances, a, and 
expected inflation, p. The presence of the last term reduces the
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externalities from long-run contracts, thereby making it more 
likely that the latter are not socially desirable.
The reason why a greater wage and price variability might be 
preferable is that long contracts, whilst reducing the 
variability of real wages over the cycle, also enhance the 
volatility of real money balances and expected inflation: nominal 
prices are predetermined and do not respond to current shocks, 
which are instead reflected in the nominal money level and in 
inflation expectations. The monopolistically competitive 
structure of product markets is obviously crucial. Expected 
inflation is a determinant of labour demand: when it moves
counter-cyclically, the variability of employment and output is 
reduced and vice versa.
Our analysis could be criticized on the grounds that the 
one-period contracting regime is observâtionally equivalent to 
the Walrasian case. As noted by DeLong and Summers (1986b, 1988), 
it is hardly surprising that the expected inflation effect is 
stabilizing in a situation of perfect markets. However, our 
results do not depend on the particular specification employed, 
as shown in Appendix B where both contracting regimes are lagged 
one period. It is demonstrated that the necessary and sufficient 
condition for negative externalities when the contract length 
increases is unchanged. Without loss of generality we can thus 
retain the much simpler framework adopted so far for the 
following discussion.
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3. Persistent demand shocks and externalities
In the previous section we have considered white noise 
disturbances to aggregate demand. It has been shown In chapters 3 
and 4, however, that the expected Inflation effect may have a 
destabilizing Influence on the level of output If demand shocks 
are autoregressive. In DeLong and Summers’ (1986b) Taylor-type 
framework, for Instance, the variance of output Is shown to 
Increase, over a certain range of parameter values, as wages 
become more responsive to excess demand In the goods market or as 
the length of contracts decreases. In the case of serially 
uncorrelated disturbances, however, wage flexibility Is still 
stabilizing as In the original Taylor’s (1980) model. Hence, some 
elements of persistence In the demand shocks appear to be 
necessary In order to generate a destabilization outcome.
In order to Investigate this Issue In a framework as similar 
as possible to that of DeLong and Summers (1986b), but which 
retains monopolistically competitive features, we assume that the 
aggregate demand shock In equation (3) follows a stationary 
AR(1) process:
(21)
2
where 0<p<l and e Is white noise with variance <r . Our model Is 
t e
now given by equations (l)-(7) and (21), and can also be 
Interpreted as a particular case of a policy rule reacting to the 
contemporaneous nominal Interest rate.
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Using the same solution procedure as before, one can find that 
in one-period contracts the aggregate price level is given by
while in two-period contracts it is given by
(23) + «+g(l-p) ”t-l
If all firms, with the exception of firm "i", are in a one-period 
contract while firm "i" is in the second period of a two-period 
contract, the wage set by the latter is equal to
(24) V ,
from which
(25) ^
and
(26) z';> = * ------   ; <rl
If instead all other firms are in a two-period contract, then
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whence
(28) = («+P) c, + \
and
(29) z|2) = (a+^ )^ <r| +
a+0
a+P(1~p)
2
O'c
From (26) and (29) it is apparent that the value of the 
externalities in either regime is an increasing function of the 
autoregressive parameter p, provided #*0.
The persistence of the demand shocks can thus actually 
increase the volatility of employment and output in presence of 
the expected inflation effect. When demand shocks are 
autoregressive, expected inflation varies less in the short 
contract case (when it is stabilizing) and varies more when the 
price level is predetermined (that is, when it is destabilizing).
This does not imply, of course, that increased wage 
flexibility in the form of shorter contracts may now be 
destabilizing. Inspection of (26) and (29) immediately reveals 
that the necessary and sufficient condition for negative 
externalities from an increase in contract length is
(30) r < a + p
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which exactly coincides with the condition (20) obtained in the 
case of serially uncorrelated demand disturbances, that is when
p=0.
The condition is unchanged because the lower stabilizing 
influence of the expected inflation effect in the short contracts 
regime is exactly compensated by the greater destabilizing
7
effects in the longer contracts case . The persistence of demand 
shocks, therefore, does not affect the relative desirability of 
short versus long-term contracts from a welfare point of view. In 
particular, the presence of the expected inflation effect still 
makes it more likely that shorter contracts might be preferred to 
longer ones, in the sense that they minimize the externalities 
arising from the existence of contracts in the economy.
4. Active policv and welfare
As demonstrated in the previous sections, increased wage 
flexibility, in the form of reduced contract length, is more 
likely to be stabilizing in presence of the expected inflation 
effect under a passive monetary policy of the kind presented by 
Driski11 and Sheffrin (1986) and DeLong and Summers (1986b). The 
conclusion emerging from our analysis is that either 
institutional reforms or policies aimed at penalizing longer 
contracts, if feasible, ought to improve welfare.
^See equations (A22b) and (A25b) in Appendix A.
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We now turn to the issue of what active demand management can
do in such a framework. We investigate the effectiveness of a
leaning against the wind policy, that is a rule designed to alter
the rate of growth of money around a fixed trend (here normalized
to zero, for simplicity) in response to lagged demand conditions.
Specifically, we assume that the monetary authorities relate the
rate of growth of the money supply to the lagged values of the
random shocks, which are here assumed to be white noise 
8processes :
(31) + St -
If all firms follow one-period contracts, the aggregate price 
level is given by
ps i-pa
(32) \
which clearly collapses to equation (11) when ô^=ô^=0. If by 
contrast all firms sign two-period contracts, the price level 
becomes a predetermined variable:
(33)
which again reduces to (13) for Ô^=ô^=0. If now all firms are in
®The relevant model is thus the one presented in section 2.
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a one-period contract while firm "i" is in the second period of a 
two-period contract, we have
(34)
and
and thus
2y
(36) z ‘î’ =    <[a+P(l-5 )]V^ + (l-pa,)V)
“  («+P): ' ( " ”
It is apparent from (35) and (36) that the monetary authority 
can reduce to zero the externalities by setting
* a+3
(37a) Ô =
(37b) 8* = %
2 P
For the countercyclical policy to be at all viable it must be 
P>0: the presence of the expected inflation effect in the
aggregate demand is a necessary condition for the effectiveness 
of (lagged feedback) active demand management.
If all firms are in the second period of a two period
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contract, then
(38) w „  = P, = m,., - - V t - i
from which
(39) = [a+p(l-a^)] + (l-pa^)
and
(40) = [a+p(l-a^)]V| + (l-/3a^)V
The optimal policy rule is again given by (37a) and (37b). Under 
this rule, the policy authority makes the choice of contract 
length completely irrelevant. This can be seen by substituting
(31), (37a) and (37b) into the one-period price (32):
(41) - S* - S*
Under the optimal countercyclical policy, the one-period price 
will be identical to the two-period price (33)*.
*By comparing (36) with (40) one could immediately see that
« *
whenever (a^ , a^)^(a^, a^) the necessary and sufficient condition 
for negative externalities from an increase in contract length is 
still ?<%+#. If the monetary authorities follow a different
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The intuition for the result is the following. Under a passive
monetary growth rule, expected inflation is unaffected by the
systematic component of monetary policy*^. A countercyclical rule,
on the other hand, affects expected inflation^^: it thus follows
that externalities can be eliminated by optimally choosing the
values of the feedback parameters. The channel for policy
12effectiveness is the existence of a non-predetermined 
intertemporal substitution term^^, that is the expected inflation 
effect.
The policy objective is to stabilize aggregate demand in the
policy than the optimal one, the relative losses associated with 
the externalities in the short and the long-term regimes are 
unchanged.
^°See equations (A12b) and (A13b) in Appendix A.
^^See equations (A36b) and (A39b).
^^Following Buiter's (1982) classification, a variable 
is non-predetermined if and only if "its current value is a 
function of current anticipations of future values of endogenous 
and/or exogenous variables".
13The same condition would ensure policy effectiveness even for 
"contract-free" new classical macroeconomic models, as shown in 
Marini (1985, 1986, 1988) and Buiter (1989).
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choke off the effects of random disturbances on real aggregate 
demand. In other words, the ex post price in the short-term 
contracts regime is forced to be the same as in the case of 
longer contracts. Perfect stabilization of aggregate demand thus 
makes the price level a predetermined variable in either case. 
Active policy can so replicate the first best of the economy 
irrespective of the actual length of contracts. In this sense we 
can reaffirm the validity of the Keynesian prediction that 
increased wage flexibility is an imperfect substitute for active
, . 14 15policy
5. Conclusions
In a monopolistically competitive framework with synchronized 
wage setting, the explicit consideration of the expected 
inflation effect makes employment variability more likely to
Perfect stabilization is of course not achievable when current 
shocks are not contemporaneously observable. However the result 
that active policy dominates increased wage flexibility still 
holds, as demonstrated in Appendix B.3.
^^It should be noticed that, under the optimal monetary rule (31), 
(37a) and (37b), the Lucas critique does not apply. The 
parameters a, and y are in fact policy invariant, and the 
private sector's choice of contract length is a matter of 
irrelevance under the optimal rule.
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wage setting, the explicit consideration of the expected 
inflation effect makes employment variability more likely to 
increase with contract length. A greater wage flexibility, in the 
form of reduced contract length, would appear to be desirable for 
a given conduct of demand management.
However, we have shown that leaning against the wind monetary 
rules can reduce the externalities arising from the existence of 
contracts, irrespective of their length. The Keynesian prediction 
that increased wage flexibility may not be a good substitute for 
active policy is thus exactly replicated.
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Appendix A
1. Demand for labour
The output demand for firm "1" is assumed to be
it
a r 1
" t f , .  « 1 •’i t
[ ' ’t j ' t j
-y
H.
where tt® = (E P -P )/P and where capital letters denote
t tt+i t '  t
variables in their natural units. Profits are then given by
(A2)
a/r
v t + 1
-  “itWt
The first-order condition for employment is
(A3)
y - 1  - i / y
a / y r 1
V t + 1
r  ^ t  ^ i t
" t j " t  J
P/r
h ; A  =
or
(A3-) =
-y r 1a r 1e -y
y «t
«ty-l
" t  J
which coincides with equation (6) in the text, apart from a 
constant factor.
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2. Uncorrelated shocks
2. (i) One-period contracts
The ’guess’ solution is
(A4) p = 7T m +t 0 t It
Upon taking expectations,
(A5)
= 71 m0 t
using (2) and the assumption that 7)^ is a white noise. 
Substituting (A5) into (10) we obtain
a+^ 7T 1
(AG) Pt =
Equating (A4) to (A6) one has
(A7) *0 =  1- *1 =
which yield equation (11) in the text.
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(11) Two-period contracts
Aggregate equation (12) and use (8) to obtain
a
(A8) + 1 - E p + —  E p
The guess solution Is
(A9)
Substituting (A9) Into (A8) we obtain
(AlO) p^ = m
t-i
and equating coefficients In (A9) and (AlO) we obtain ir^ =l, I.e. 
equation (13).
(Ill) Externalities
If all other firms sign one-period contracts, then the wage 
for firm "1" Is given by (12) while the aggregate price level Is 
given by (11). Since E p = E p = m , we obtain
t-i t t-i t+i t-i
(All) w,^ = V i
The components of labour demand (6) are
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(A12a)
(A12b)
(A12c) - P.t = - \
from which we obtain equation (15).
If instead the other firms are in the second period of a 
two-period contract the price level is (13). The components of 
labour demand are
(A13a) m^ - p^ =
(A13b) - Pt = «t
(A13c) w^^ - p^ = 0
and by substitution into (6) we obtain equation (18).
3. Autocorrelated shocks
(i) One-period contracts
The price equation is (10), which is here reported for 
convenience:
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( 'O ' ^  \
The guess solution is
(A14) = W *  "i ’It
Take expectations of (A14) using (21)
(A14- ) = "o "t * \ P \
After substituting into (10), one has
a+pTi 1+Ppn.
(A'S' Pt = \  * \
Equate (A14) and (A15) to obtain
(A16) Tt = 1 
0
TT =
1 a+p(1-p)
which yield the price equation (22) in the text,
(ii) Two-period contracts
Aggregate equation (12) to obtain
a
(A17) p^ = - + 1 +
p 1
E p + — E p + —  p T)
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The guess solution is
(A18)
Pt = "o "t-1 " "l \ - l
Taking expectations,
(A18')
(A18")
^t-iPi« = %  "i-i * \ P \ - 1
and hence (A17) becomes
(A19) Pt =
a  a
- + 7 T  n7 0 y 0 J
a+p P 1
7 1  n + — on + — p[I 7 1 y 1 y J •n
By comparison of (A18) with (A19) one obtains the coefficients of 
equation (24):
(A20) TT = 1
0 a+^(l-p)
(iii) Externalities
All other firms are in a one-period contract. Using the 
price equation (22), the wage for firm "i" is given by
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(A21) = - E^_m^ *
a+p '
1 -
13
E p + — E p
t-i^t y t-i^t+i
*  ;
= m +
t-i ' K+p(l-p) \-i
The components of labour demand are thus
(A22a)
” a+p(l-p)
(A22b) E p - p = —
1-p
t^t+i a+p(l-p) \
(A22c)
^it %+p(l-p)
Hence,
(A23)
a P(l-p)
” a+p(l-p) \  a+p(l-p) \  ^ ^ ^
^ a+p(l-p) ^ \
* * *+p(l-p)
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which coincides with equation (25).
Let all other firms be in a two-period contract. The price is 
given by equation (23), which immediately implies
(A24) + a * p ( i - p )  V i
Then one has
(A25a)
P
"‘t a+p(l-p) \-i
p(p-l)
(A25b) E p - p = ^  r v  ^ +t^ t+i a+p(l-p) t-i a+p(l-p)
(A25c) w^^ - p^ = 0
and by substitution into (6) we obtain
ocp pp(p-l)
(A26) - a+g(l-p) + 9 (t + a+pci-p) \-i
PP
* a+p(l-p) * P \-i *
= (a+/3) Ç +
a+(3
*t a+p(l-p) 
which is equation (28) in the text.
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4. Countercyclical money rule
(1) One-period contracts
The aggregate price is giyen by equation (10). Giyen the 
money rule (31), the guess solution is
(A27) = "o "t * "i (t + "2 \
and implies
(A28) = %  (■«, - S/St -
By substitution into (10) one obtains
and by comparison of (A27) with (A29) we get
(ii) Two-period contracts
Aggregating the wage equation (12) we obtain
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(A31)
+ 2 e  p  +  -  E T) r  t - i^t+ i  y t -1 t
The guess solution is
(A32)
Take expectations of (A32) and substitute into (A31) to get
(A33) p^ = f a  a 1— + n  71 my 0 y 0 J t - i
-  f  V o  I V .
( - 5
Ô  +  7t —
a+|3
2 2 y "2 - f «2% ) \-l
from which
(A34) 7T = 1 TT =  -  Ô
0 1 1
71 =  -  Ô
2 2
which give equation (33)
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(iii) Externalities
Let us assume that all firms with the exception of firm 
"i" sign one-period contracts. The wage equation (12) together 
with the price equation (32) imply
(A35) (fi ■ ® 2 V i
The components of labour demand are
ps i-pa
(A36a)
a$ CLÔ + 1
(A36b) - Pt = - 5?#
a+Pd-S ) 1-PÔ
(A36C) = ------------------------ \
and hence
which coincides with equation (35).
If instead all other firms are in a two-period contract, 
combine equations (12) and (33) to obtain
(A38) - « A - 1  ' Pt
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and
(A39a)
(A39b) - Pt = (1-a.) - V t
(A39c) = 0
By substitution of (A39a)-(A39c) into the labour demand (6) we 
can thus obtain equation (39).
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Appendix B
In the present Appendix we derive the critical conditions for 
negative externalities in contract length, under the assumption 
that current shocks are not observed when contracts are signed. 
Our previous results are not affected in any substantial way by 
this change in the informational assumptions of the model: the
necessary and sufficient condition for negative externalities is 
still shown to be given by
r  < a + /3
(equation (20) in the text) for each of the cases that we 
consider.
We retain the assumption that the firms have the option of 
signing either one- or two-period contracts. These are however 
redifined as follows. In the one-period contracts, firms set 
wages for time t at the end of period t-1, before the realization 
of the shocks Employment is instead set after the
uncertainty about current shocks is resolved. In the two-period 
contracts, wages are set at the end of period t-2.
Formally, the one-period contracts in the present context are 
comparable to the two-period contracts of the analysis developed 
in the text and in Appendix A. We can thus use for the former the 
analytical results already obtained for the latter. The model is 
then given by the money supply (2), the labour demand equation 
(6), and the wage setting rules which are derived below.
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1. Uncorrelated shocks
(i) One-period contracts
Let the shock be a white noise process with variance (r\ 
Firm "i" sets w^^ at the end of period t-1 by solving the 
equation Therefore the analysis can proceed as in
Section A.2.(ii), and the solution for the price level is
(Bl) Pt = V ,
(ii) Two-period contracts
If all firms are in the first period of a two-period 
contract, prices are given by equation (Bl) above. Let firms at 
time t be in the period of a two-period contract. Then
E p + — E T)y t-2^ t+i r t-2 t
Aggregating,
Pt =  Ï  “ t-. " ( ‘ ^  ) ^t-zPt + f  ^t-aPt.i
The guess solution for the level of prices has the form
(B4)
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which of course also implies
(B5) = «0 ^.3
By contrast, since there is no staggering, prices at t+1 must be 
given according to (Bl) by
(B6) = m.
and hence
= "t-2
By substitution of (B5) and (B7) into (B3) and solving we obtain
(B8) P, = in^ .3
(iii) Externalities
When firm "i" is in the last period of a two-period 
contract and all other firms are in a one-period contracts, we 
have p = m , E p = m , and w = m , which imply
t-1 t^ t+i t It t-2 ^
(B9a) m^ - p^ =
(B9b) E^P,,, - Pt = «t
(B9c) - Pt = ■ (fl
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The value of the externalities is thus
(BIO) = [(a+p)^ + <r| + <r^
Suppose now that all firms are in the last period of a two-period 
contract. Then p = m , E p = m (since price setting is
t-2 t^t+i t ^
synchronized), and w = m , and therefore
it t-2
(Blla) Ml - Pt = St + St.,
(Bllb) - Pt = «t " «t-1
(Bllc) w^^ - p^ = 0
The externalities are given by
(B12) z|2) = 2(a+p)^ <r| +
By comparing (BIO) with (B12), the critical condition for 
negative externalities from an increase in contract length is 
seen to be
y < a + p
By contrast, if firm "i" is in the first period of a 
two-period contract, its losses are easily shown to be 
independent of other firms' contract length. Formally, if all
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firms are in one-period contracts then the components of firm 
"i" 's labour demand are given by
(B13a) m^ - p^ =
(B13b) - Pt = St
(B13c) - p^ = 0
and its losses are
(B14)  ^ = (a+3)^ (Tç + <r^
If instead all firms, with the exception of firm "i", are in the 
second period of two-period contracts then
(BlSa)
(BlSb) E^P,,, - Pt = (t + V i
(B15C) - P, = ^
whence
(B16)  ^ = (a+p)^ <Tç + (T^
which coincides with (B14). Therefore, if firm "i" signs short-
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term contracts its losses do not depend on whether the other 
firms are in short or long-term contracts. The intuition behind 
this result is clear: in the above framework, externalities arise 
due to the inability of firms to adjust wages in the face of 
changes of the aggregate price level. When firm "i" signs one- 
period contracts, it is at least as fast in adjusting to 
aggregate shocks as the other firms. It is therefore always able 
to react to any changes in aggregate prices. The losses (B14) 
(or (B16)) are indeed always strictly lower than the 
corresponding expressions (BIO) or (B12): they are thus reduced
to a level which cannot be further decreased given the 
information lag in the wage setting process.
This finding is a general result, which does not depend on the 
absence of serial correlation between the shocks nor on the 
assumed properties of the money supply process. Hence, in the 
next sections of the present Appendix we shall only compute the 
losses for the case in which firm "i" is in the second period of 
a two-period contract.
2. Autocorrelated shocks
The demand shock evolves now according to equation (21) in 
the text:
If all firms sign one-period contracts, the price level is given
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by
(B17) P, = V l
In the second period of a two-period contract, prices are
(B18) P, = V 2 + \ - 2
Let us now assume that firm "i" is in the second period of a 
two-period contract. If all other firms shift from one to two- 
period contracts, firm "i" 's losses are respectively given by
(B20) z<2' = 2(«+p): al * '«+9' <r"
"■ ^ [a+B(l-p)l ®
in the usual notation. Condition (20) still applies.
3. Countercvclical monev rule
The monetary authorities follow the lagged feedback policy 
rule (31), which is here reported for convenience:
Under one period contracts, the aggregate price level is
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{B2D P, =
whilst in the second period of two-period contracts prices are
If firm "i" is in the second period of a two-period contract 
while all other firms are in a one-period contract, then
(B23) = < [a+B(l-5j)]^ + } o-!
If all firms are in two-period contracts,
and > z|^  ^ iff a+|3 > y.
It is interesting to notice that in this case the monetary 
authorities can no longer eliminate the losses by means of a 
suitable choice of the policy parameters 0^ and S^ . They can 
however still exert a stabilizing influence, and indeed it would
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be easy to show that employment variability would now be 
minimized by setting
(B25a) Ô = 1 +
(B25a) 6 =
where
y under one-period contracts
a+|3 under two-period contracts
* *
It is apparent that 6^, as defined in (B25a), (B25b) do
not reduce the losses to zero. There exist externalities which 
cannot be removed by a lagged-feedback policy rule. The reason 
for this is that, in the framework considered here, wages and 
prices are entirely predetermined, whilst employment is free to 
react to contemporaneous disturbances.
Perfect stabilization is therefore no longer a feasible 
target. Active policy is however always capable of reducing the 
variability of the level of employment relative to a situation of 
no intervention (i.e. ô^=ô^=0).
Moreover, when short contracts prevail, the value of the 
externalities in the absence of a feedback policy is given by
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(B26) /I)it [(a+3)^ + r^] <r| + <r^
Ô =0 =0 
1 2
On the other hand, the optimal policy reduces the losses to
(B27) ,(2)
it « «
S —S fÔ —5 
1 1 2  2
^ o?ia^+Za$)(a+pf 
[ff+(a+p)2]2
+ («+P)
ef+(a+P)2 ”
Since (B27) is always smaller than (B26), we can restate the 
superiority of active policy vis-à-vis wage flexibility.
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